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Abstract
Interbank markets are critical to banking systems, as they enable banks to manage
liquidity and allow monetary policy to go through. As the 2007 global financial cri-
sis shows, an unexpected “freeze up” of interbank markets can cause difficulties for
central bank interventions and the overall economy, which demonstrates the need
to better understand systemic risk. To this aim, a comprehensive picture of inter-
bank markets and their lending networks is necessary and of much importance. The
objective of this study is to deepen our understanding of interbank network forma-
tion, which has received relatively less attention. We hope to better perceive how
factors like asymmetric information and liquidity preference influence the interbank
structure, and to further explore impacts from monetary policy.
In the first essay of this study, we develop a model of the formation of interbank
lending network, with risk aversive banks maximising expected profits in the case
of information asymmetry. The equilibrium interbank structures are investigated
to understand how a “freeze” market is likely to occur in a stress situation. In
the second paper of this study, we introduce another interbank network formation
model where a large number of homogenous banks having preferences to both profits
and cash. Interest rates are determined endogenously through an internal trade off
between these preferences. Realistic network structures are found in the interbank
market of computer experiments. The third essay further considers the impact of
monetary policy on the interbank market proposed in essay 2. The key features of the
interbank market structure remain roughly unchanged after central bank operation.
However, banks of different network positions are not symmetrically impacted.
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1 Motivation and research objective
Interbank markets are critical to banking systems because they enable banks to manage,
exchange and redistribute liquidity and allow monetary policy to be implemented and
transmitted to the wider economy. The well functioning of the interbank markets are
thus crucial to the health of the overall economy. During the 2007 global financial crisis,
many interbank markets experienced severe liquidity shortages. Banks were reluctant to
rollover short-term loans, making interbank borrowing rates to rise record high. Moreover,
this “freeze up” of interbank markets caused difficulties for central bank interventions
that aimed to provide liquidity to banks and led to a resort to unconventional monetary
policies. Compared to the fact that the failure of sub prime mortgage market was actually
predicted by some people, the liquidity freeze was much less anticipated, suggesting room
to improve the understanding of interbank markets. To achieve this aim, in the post crisis
literature, numerous efforts embracing different perspectives have been made in relevant
fields of study.
One burgeoning area is to represent interbank borrowing/lending as a network, i. e. each
bank is represented by a node and an interbank loan is denoted by a directed linkage. This
network perspective is very useful in analysis of a financial contagion, where a (solvency
or liquidity) problem of one single bank can be spread along a chain of banks through
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interbank market, bring down multiple banks along the way, and may eventually endanger
the entire banking system (Allen & Gale (2000), Mart´ınez-Jaramillo et al. (2010), Gai
et al. (2011)). Financial contagion is an important form of systemic risk that is disruptive
to the stability of financial system, as evident in 2007 financial crisis. There are two
important aspects that need to be considered in the study of financial contagion through
interbank network, yet received relatively less attention. One is that the network is not
likely to be static because banks are able to react to arrivals of various information and
adjust their behaviours accordingly. In other words, the interbank network may change
drastically in response to a possibility of crisis. Therefore, it is meaningful to study
how network can be formed by strategic behaviours of banks. The other aspect is that
interbank network structure matters for the spread of financial contagion, which is shown
by substantial studies (Allen & Gale (2000), Gai & Kapadia (2010), Acemoglu et al.
(2015)). In addition, as demonstrated by empirical studies, interbank networks in reality
are found to possess a number of topology features including a core periphery structure
that arise endogenously (Craig & Von Peter (2014), Langfield et al. (2014), Fricke &
Lux (2015)). To understand the interbank market properly, it is crucial to include these
realistic features in modeling the formation of interbank network.
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the topic of interbank network formation. Studies
on the network formation of interbank markets are relatively few among the overall inter-
bank network literature. The mechanism underlying the formation, the factors affecting
the network and the emergence of certain structures of the interbank market are not thor-
oughly understood. We thus are interested in contributing to the literature by studying
how interbank networks are formed and using network formation models to shed light
on the interbank borrowing/lending and monetary policy. Essay 1 presents a model of
interbank network formation that allows us to study the equilibrium network structures,
where banks assess counterparty default risks based on asymmetric information and seek
to maximize profits from interbank lending. Essay 2 introduces another interbank net-
work formation model where a large number of homogenous banks under random reserve
shocks favour both profitability and liquidity. Different from essay 1, the counterparty
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default risk is neglected and there is no asymmetric information in essay 2. Essay 3 is
built on the model of essay 2 and introduces a central bank operation before the com-
mencement of the interbank market. How liquidity injection/extraction effects interbank
market is studied, especially in terms of interbank network properties. Essay 1 and 2
compliments each other as they deal with the network formation of different interbank
markets where banks have different primary concerns. In essay 1, banks are risk averse,
concerned with borrowers’ insolvency and faced with asymmetric information. This ap-
plies to the interbank market in a stress situation. In essay 2, on the contrary, interbank
lending is assumed to be very safe and banks think more cash is desirable, which is similar
to a precautionary need. This applies to a non-stress interbank market that is believed
to be close to risk free. Both fear for counterpaty insolvency and precautionary need for
liquidity are possible explanations as to why the interbank “freeze” occurred in financial
crisis. Essay 1 and 2 also differ in determination of interbank lending rates. Interest rates
in essay 1 are exogenously given while they are endogenously determined in essay 2 and
followed by essay 3.
2 Summary of essays and contributions
This section summarises the contents of three essays. Briefly, in essay 1, we propose a
model to study the short-term interbank lending from a network formation perspective,
find equilibrium structures of the interbank network and show how their occurrences
depend on banks’ individual behaviours. In essay 2, we develop a model of the interbank
lending based on liquidity and profitability considerations of homogeneous banks and find
the established network having realistic features. In essay 3, we further introduce a central
bank operation in form of liquidity auction before the interbank market based on essay 2,
show the equilibrium outcome of the auction under different tenders and assumptions, and
analyse how the interbank network structure and interbank rates are influenced comparing
to a benchmark of no such operation.
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2.1 Essay 1
We develop a model of network formation to study the short-term interbank lending.
Banks have deep pockets, i. e. they are able to lend and borrow without any constraint.
Each bank is a borrower and/or lender. A lender assesses each borrower individually by
a utility function that increases when expected return increases or variance of the return
decreases. The possibility of a borrower’s insolvency is embedded in the uncertainty of
return. The banks first receive information containing a public and a private (noise) signal
about the solvency of other banks. We assume banks to be homogenous, i. e. all banks
have identical expected returns and only their private signals are different. They may
then observe each other’s lending decisions. The existence/absense of lending generates
information on the lender’s private signal. For instance, if the lending exist, the lender
must expect a high enough return that compensates its exposure to risk. Other banks
knowing the public signal can infer some knowledge about this lender’s private signal and
adjust their assessment to the borrower accordingly.
Equilibrium structures of a three-bank interbank network is determined and evaluated.
We first analyse individual lending strategies and obtain the probability of choosing each
strategy. We then examine strategy combinations and apply an algorithm to determine
all possible equilibria and their corresponding probabilities. There are 16 possible equi-
librium interbank network structures in total. Among them, four are dominant in terms
of occurrence. Banks in these four equilibrium structures are observed to exhibit herding
behaviour, i. e. they either lend to the same borrower or refuse to do so simultaneously.
We find that how likely each structure is to occur depends on banks’ risk aversion, the
expected returns on interbank loans, and uncertainty of information. We analyse the
effect of each factor by holding others constant. The equilibrium structures help to shed
some light on the liquidity freeze in the interbank market. In a stressed market featuring
high expectations of insolvency, banks eventually form a frozen market where no bank is
willing to lend to any other bank. In a stressed market featuring high risk aversion, banks
may have multiple equilibrium structures including a freeze, because banks may either
refuse lending or follow each other’s decisions. We then consider heterogenous banks and
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find it not affecting the outcome substantially. The results obtained for the homogeneous
case can thus be shown to be robust.
2.2 Essay 2
In this essay, we introduce a model of interbank network formation in a large homogeneous
banking system. The interbank market considered here can be thought as an overnight
market where interbank loans are thought to be of little default risk. Banks are assumed
to neglect default risk and focus instead on liquidity management and profitability. To be
more precise, banks are assumed to have preferences towards higher cash reserve (liquidity)
and higher return on equity (profitability) in a utility function of Cobb-Douglas form. The
balance sheet of a bank is also specified with all long-term items and rates fixed. Banks are
all alike in terms of leverage, liquidity holdings and size at the beginning, but suffer from
exogenous and random liquidity shocks. To model behaviours of individual banks, or how
they ask/offer interbank loan rates specifically, we borrow the idea of the inventory model
of market makers in market microstructure literature. Banks consider the optimal amount
of liquidity to hold (their “inventory”) and are willing to deviate from it by adjusting the
price (interest rate) of the asset (interbank loan) to increase their overall utility, see Stoll
(1978) for the original model. Providing a loan to another bank will reduce liquidity and
at the same time increase returns due to the interest earned, while obtaining such a loan
will increase liquidity and reduce returns as interest is being paid.
We study some key properties of the banks’ individual behaviours. We show that a
bank has an optimal liquidity ratio conditional on an interbank market with no arbitrage
opportunities and that a bank does not seek a loan from a borrower in a subsequent
transaction, consistent with reality. Most importantly, we calculate, for a given liquidity
and return level, the reservation rate at which each bank is willing to borrow and lend
to other banks. Here we interpret banks as resembling market makers that are willing to
“buy” and “sell” liquidity. The spread of a bank’s reservation rates between lending and
borrowing is found to be always positive. The effects of changing liquidity and the return
on a bank’s reservation rates and spread are also derived.
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Banks may trade any excess liquidity in the interbank market by lending to banks with
liquidity shortfalls in order to maximize utility, so that reserves are reallocated among
banks. The trading is organized through a decentralized (over the counter) market, where
banks meet bilaterally for lending/borrowing with standardized size of each transaction.
A bank ask other banks in a random order for quotes and make transactions when the
quotes are more favourable than its reservation prices. The bank also remembers who it
has asked for quotes and can have multiple trades with the same bank if its offer is still
better than that of any other bank. When all banks have been asked, another bank is
selected randomly to continue the process until no further transaction is possible among
all banks.
In the evaluation of results, we run a large number of computer experiments with random
parameter setting. We first focus on the properties of the obtained interbank networks.
The vast majority of these interbank networks exhibit a core-periphery structure. Besides,
other realistic properties that are commonly found in empirical studies are also observed,
such as low density, negative assortativity, fat tails of the degree distribution and short
average path lengths. We then analyse how the emergence of the core-periphery structure
is affected by parameter values. We find the core-periphery structure is more pronounced
when banks are less concerned about liquidity but more about returns, or when they
have higher leverage. A larger banking system or a larger size of each interbank loan also
contribute to the emergence of core-periphery structure, while reducing the size of core.
We then consider the properties of banks in the core and periphery. Banks in the core
are borrowing at lower rates than those in the periphery and are lending at higher rates.
They are also much more active, with higher interbank borrowing and lending, higher
leverage, but thinner cash. As a result, they enjoy higher return and utility compared
to banks in periphery. We also analyse determinants of a bank’s position in interbank
network and find that banks that enter the market early or face a larger liquidity shock
are most likely to become core banks.
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2.3 Essay 3
In this essay, we introduce a central bank into the banking system modeled in essay 2.
The central bank conducts monetary policy through an auction of short-term central bank
funds. The central bank may choose to implement either liquidity injection or liquidity
extraction via the auction. The auction is held before the start of the interbank market
after banks receiving idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. As a result, banks participating in
the auction have varying liquidity levels and thus heterogenous valuations for liquidity,
which we assume to be public information. They submit bid schedules strategically to
maximize the overall utility. The utility function used by banks is identical to that in
essay 2. After the auction (central bank lending/borrowing), banks’ liquidity positions
and returns are updated and they can further adjust their liquidity holdings through the
interbank market.
We first view the central bank operation and the interbank market for reserves as sepa-
rated, i. e. banks do not consider funding through the interbank market when bidding
for central bank funds. We consider two types of tenders for the central bank operation,
a fixed rate operation with full allotment and a variable rate operation. For the same
banking system, a bank are shown to have different individual valuation and bid schedule
when we switch the type of operation. Specifically, the bid schedule in the variable rate
tender has a flat area as opposed to that in the fixed rate tender with a downward sloping
shape. In both tenders, bid shading is present though not of the same degree. However,
the above differences do not affect the equilibrium price of central bank funds as the same
equilibrium outcome can be achieved through either type of tender.
We then view the central bank operation and the interbank market for reserves as interde-
pendent. Banks form some anticipation of the cost of funding later through the interbank
market when they bid for central bank funds. And banks here seek to maximize the over-
all utility from the borrowing/lending from/to both the central bank and the interbank
market, instead of only considering the utility gain from central bank operation. This
not only alters the equilibrium rates for central bank funds but also influences subsequent
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interbank trading. We also run a large number of computer experiments with random-
ized parameter values and find the equilibrium rate in central bank operation to be also
dependent on other determinants.
We further analyse the effects of monetary policy by comparing each of the settings above
with the benchmark case of no central bank operation. We find the basic structure of the
interbank network roughly maintains, with or without the central bank operation, i. e.
core-periphery structure, small core, low-density network. However, liquidity injection
does make the core-periphery structure less pronounced while liquidity extraction has
the opposite effect. Also, both liquidity injection and extraction reduce the number of
active banks and amount of trading in the interbank market. Core/periphery banks are
found to still lend at higher/lower rates in the interbank market after the central bank
operation. However, we find core and periphery banks are affected differently by central
bank operation, in terms of exposure to interbank market and reliance on central bank
funds etc. In addition, periphery banks are found to be under stronger influence than
core banks.
2.4 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis is to help to the understanding of the formation of
interbank network in multiple ways.
Essay 1 contributes to the understanding of the liquidity freeze from a network perspec-
tive. It provides insights to show the presence of asymmetric information gives rise to a
freeze in interbank lending. Especially, we show the interbank network features multiple
equilibrium structures, i. e. in a stress situation both freeze and non-freeze market struc-
tures are possible. This contributes to the understanding of the fragility of the financial
market, being possible to flip from a well-functioning one to a mal-functioning one.
Essay 2 helps to understand the emergence of network structure from a framework where
banks have preferences for not only profits but also liquidity. Interest rates are determined
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based on the tradeoff between these preferences. It also contributes to the literature on
the interbank network formation by analysing what drives the interbank lending networks
to possess realistic features in terms of network structure and endogenous interest rates.
Essay 3 how the presence of a central bank may affect the interbank network through
liquidity injection/extraction. It contributes to the understanding of how monetary policy
goes through the banking system by showing that key properties of the interbank market
more or less remains, yet banks of different positions are asymmetrically impacted by
monetary policy.
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Equilibrium interbank lending networks
Di Xiao∗ Andreas Krause†
Abstract
We propose a model to study short-term interbank lending from a net-
work formation perspective. Banks, being provided with public and private
signals about the solvency of other banks, decide on interbank lending by also
considering the decision of other banks to lend. We observe that the domi-
nant equilibrium networks are those where banks follow each others’ decisions,
making the equilibria very vulnerable to shifts in expectations. The networks
range from fully connected (highly liquid markets) to empty networks (frozen
markets) and we derive the conditions under which they emerge.
1 Introduction
As evidenced, for example, during the 2007 global financial turmoil, a characteristic
of a financial crisis is contagion where a relatively small event, like the failure of a
single financial institution, may trigger a chain reaction. This failure can spread to
the whole financial system and eventually reach out to the real economy. In order
to capture the connections between financial institutions a network approach has
been chosen that focuses on interbank lending.
Financial systems can be seen as networks, with nodes representing individual finan-
cial institutions, and links representing their bilateral exposures, such as interbank
loans, credit lines or derivatives positions. Starting from the parsimonious financial
network of Allen & Gale (2000) which consists of only four banks, scholars have
∗University of Bath, Department of Economics, Bath BA2 7AY, email: D.Xiao@bath.ac.uk
†University of Bath, Department of Economics, Bath BA2 7AY, email: mnsak@bath.ac.uk
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investigated various financial networks for a wide range of markets that are increas-
ingly detailed and realistic, see Upper (2011) for a review of interbank network
properties. The network structure is found to be greatly influential for the systemic
risk of a banking system, where the failure of a single bank may cause the failure of
a significant number of other banks and endanger the stability of the whole banking
system (see e.g. Nier et al. (2007), Gai & Kapadia (2010), Acemoglu et al. (2013)).
Although some universal features of financial networks have been discovered and
studied, many questions await further exploration, such as how these features arise
from interactions between individual financial institutions, how they further influ-
ence other banks’ behaviors, and how these interactions may help to escalate or
mitigate systemic risk.
One of the motives behind this work is to offer some insights into the phenomenon
of liquidity freezes in interbank markets as was clearly observed and highly noted
in the 2007 financial crisis. Money markets that were used to be highly liquid
suddenly saw a ”freeze” in liquidity, with extremely high borrowing rates. Two
possible explanations are offered as to why market players with excess liquidity are
not willing to lend to the market in Gale & Yorulmazer (2013): fear of counter-
party risks and liquidity hoarding (fear of a future liquidity shortage). These two
fears may intertwine together to cause a ”freeze” in interbank lending. Among the
literature referring to financial network formations, few have focused on explaining
liquidity freezes, yet it should be interesting to explore this issue from the network
formation perspective and how such freezes might emerge.
In this paper, based on the idea in Fique & Page (2013) and developed further, we
propose a model for the formation of short-term interbank loan networks, under the
assumption that banks can observe each others’ lending decisions and adjust their
evaluations of borrowers accordingly. Specifically, this assumption allows banks
to exchange views about whether to lend to a borrower without fully revealing
their private signals. Under this assumption, a bank’s lending decision generates
information to other banks and they may sometimes exhibit herding in making
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lending decisions. Our primary interest is to find equilibrium structures of interbank
networks ranging from a complete network (fully liquid market) to an empty network
(market freeze), and show how their occurrence depends on individual behaviour.
We find that how likely each structure is to occur depends on banks’ risk aversion,
the expected returns on interbank loans, and uncertainty of private information. For
a stressed market, featuring low expectations of debt paying ability, banks eventually
cause a frozen market. For a stressed market featuring high risk aversion, banks may
have multiple equilibrium structures including a freeze, because banks may either
refuse lending or follow each other’s decisions.
The main part of this article is organized as follows: in section 2, we review the
related literature and section 3 develops the model of how individual banks form and
update their beliefs while section 4 assesses their decisions about interbank lending
and describes the algorithm used to determine the equilibrium network structures.
We analyse the probability distribution of equilibrium networks in section 5 and
section 6 discusses some policy implications before we conclude our article in section
7.
2 Determinants of interbank lending
Firstly, this work is related to a strand of literature investigating systemic risk in
interbank markets. The mechanisms of contagion can be generally classified into two
types: contagion through direct links, which refers to a situation where one insolvent
bank may cause losses to its creditor bank and consequently triggers insolvency
among its creditors; and secondly contagion through indirect links, which includes
liquidity hoarding, common assets exposure under fire sales, and bank runs.
Studies of contagion through direct links are perhaps most abundant. Some impor-
tant early models all follow the standard model of Diamond & Dybvig (1983) but
extend it with a network perspective. However, these models consider only very
simple network structures, usually only three structures are studied, a complete
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network, a ring network and an empty network. Allen & Gale (2000) and Freixas
et al. (2000) are two such early standard models, which have much similar set-
tings. Banks have incentives to hold bilateral exposures, changing deposits (Allen
& Gale (2000)) or having credit lines (Freixas et al. (2000)), due to uncertainty
about deposit withdrawals, uncertainty of when depositors they consume (Allen &
Gale (2000)) or where they consume (Freixas et al. (2000)). Then under the three
different network structures, they examine how the shocks spread out through a
liquidity preference shock (Allen & Gale (2000)) or risky long-term assets (Freixas
et al. (2000)). Similar conclusions are drawn from both models, a complete network
is usually more stable than an incomplete network (a ring network) since there are
more banks to share the loss of a given shock. Following this strand of literature,
Babus (2007), Leitner (2005), and Allen et al. (2010) investigate network forma-
tions in which banks choose to form a network that maximize their utility through
risk diversification, profit maximization or reducing the risk of contagion. Another
strand of literature develops models of financial contagion based on more complex
networks, mainly random graphs, and most of these studies have noted that some
sort of ”phase transition” of systemic risk happens in such networks, which is also
referred to by Haldane (2013) as financial networks having ”robust-yet-fragile” fea-
ture. In models like Gai & Kapadia (2010) and Gai et al. (2011), this feature means
that there exist tipping points for the level of connectivity, and that sharp changes
in levels of systemic risk (the extent of contagion) occur around these tipping points.
Acemoglu et al. (2013) find that tipping points also exist for the size of initial shock.
Amini et al. (2012) find a necessary condition for contagion to not encompass the
entire network and develop a resilience measure which is a function of each bank’s
connectivity and fraction of contagious links. All tipping points for macroeconomic
shocks correspond to positive resilience measure values. Caccioli et al. (2012) de-
velop the work of Gai & Kapadia (2010) by adding heterogeneity into the model
and show that heterogenous connectivity, the size of banks and degree correlations
play a role in determining the stability of a financial system.
Studies of contagion through indirect linkage include liquidity hoarding, common
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asset exposures under fire sales, and bank runs. Rochet & Vives (2004) present a
model showing that banks can be illiquid but solvent. They find that in equilibrium
it is possible that solvent banks still fail to obtain liquidity from interbank markets
due to the liquidity hoarding of informed investors. For this reason, they argue the
importance of a lender of last resort. Heider et al. (2015) present a model that
highlight the role of asymmetric information in the assessment of counterparty risk
leading to liquidity hoarding among liquid potential providers of funds. The result
is that the market fails to reach the desirable equilibrium but instead reaches a
liquidity freeze. Acharya & Skeie (2011) present a model showing precautionary
liquidity hoarding arising from lenders fearing rollover risk that can help to explain
market stress, where high rates and low volumes for borrowing are the result of
high leverage and the illiquidity of assets. Gale & Yorulmazer (2013) present a
similar model of banks’ choices between liquid and illiquid assets in a portfolio
where banks have incentives to hoard liquidity not only due to rollover risk but
also have the opportunity to buy fire sale assets of other banks that face liquidity
shortages. Finally, Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2009) present a model that considers
the interplay of market liquidity and funding liquidity and shows that they can be
mutually reinforcing as liquidity spirals when margins are destabilising.
Secondly, this work is also related to another growing strand of literature on network
formation games as applied to financial systems. One strand sees the network for-
mation as a static game, like Leitner (2005), Babus (2007), Acemoglu et al. (2013),
where all individuals make decisions simultaneously. They are all based on the
standard model of Allen & Gale (2000) but extend it to N banks and assume banks
consider the risk of potential shocks to them or to their neighbors when choosing
links. In Leitner (2005), this is done by a social planner solving for and then propos-
ing an optimal network based on the banks’ random initial endowments with banks
choosing to accept the proposal or have an empty network. In making decisions,
banks try to balance the tradeoff between risk sharing and the risk of contagion.
This is because being linked in a network on the one hand offers resources to lend
from when one is facing an unexpected liquidity shock, yet on the other hand, one
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may suffer from losses when others withdraw money. In the model of Babus (2007)
banks are classified into two types, and banks play a network formation game within
each type. The primary concern of a bank is to prevent the risk of contagion, thus
a bank chooses the network where no single neighbor’s liquidation should lead to
its own bankruptcy. In the model of Acemoglu et al. (2013) banks propose debt
contracts conditional on borrowers’ lending behaviour. As a result Leitner (2005)
find the network can be ex ante optimal, but a collapse of the whole system may still
occur in some cases. Babus (2007) show the network can be resilient with a large
number of banks, which means the probability of contagion can be close to zero.
Acemoglu et al. (2013) find that the equilibrium interbank network formed can be
vulnerable to contagion, due to the presence of financial network externalities which
cause the emergence of socially inefficient network.
Another strand of this literature see the network formation as a process of evolution,
e.g. Lenzu & Tedeschi (2012) and Anand et al. (2012). In the model of Lenzu &
Tedeschi (2012) banks form a network from random rewiring. The possibility a
bank links to another bank depends on the latter’s profitability, a bank’s in-degree
is thus a signal for its profitability. How much banks value this signal influences the
structure of the network eventually formed. In the model of Anand et al. (2012)
rollover decisions are made as in a foreclosure game. Whether a bank chooses to
rollover depends on its cost of miscoordination and the borrower’s asset-to-liability
ratio, which are random and time-dependent. Consequently, the network structure
evolves overtime, and the average connectivity in the stationary state depends on
debt maturity and miscoordination cost. There is also model like Cohen-Cole et al.
(2010) that use a combination of static and dynamic games.
Among the work studying interbank network formation, we especially refer to Fique
& Page (2013) where rollover decisions of banks depend on the existing architecture
of interbank networks. We keep the salient feature of their model, which is a bank’s
lending decision provides information to other banks, but have notable differences
in both the details of the approach taken and aim of the model.
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3 A model of interbank lending decisions
We assess a banking system in which N banks are considering lending to each other.
For simplicity we assume that all loans are of the same size and mature in a single
time period such that we can focus on the rollover decisions by banks. Furthermore,
there are no constraints on the ability of banks to lend to each other and banks are
always willing to accept any loans they are given. This simplification allows us to
concentrate on the lending decision itself rather than having to consider the impact
of any such constraints on the outcomes. Banks only differ in their risk of repaying
this loan and the signals banks receive about this risk.
Interbank lending can be represented by a directed network where each node rep-
resents a bank and the edges the existence of a loan between two banks. This
network can be represented by an adjacency matrix A = {aij}i,j=1,...,N , where
aij = 1 if bank i lends to bank j and zero otherwise. Obviously we require that
∀i = 1, . . . , N : aii = 0.
Decisions on interbank lending are assumed to be done decentrally such that each
loan is assessed individually by a risk averse decision-maker maximizing expected
utility. Approximating the expected utility of bank i giving a loan to bank j in the
usual way with absolute risk aversion λi ≥ 0, we get





where µij and σ
2
ij denote the expected value and variance of the return bank i
believes to be generated from lending to bank j. This return will not only include
the interest charged, but most importantly also include the possible default of bank
j and the subsequent losses arising from this.
The following section will now explore how these expected values and variances are
determined. We will use information based on public and private signals in a first
step to assess each loan and then in addition also use information based on the
lending decisions of other banks.
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3.1 Assessment of private signals on interbank lending re-
turns
Banks know that the true return of bank i, ri, is a random variable that is normally








This true return, however, cannot be directly observed. Instead each bank receives
a private noisy signal that is independent of the true return as well as independent
across banks:






Here bank i is lending to bank j. A bank can then use the noisy signal r̂ij to infer
the true return of the borrower using conditional expectations:
µj|i = E [rj|r̂ij] = µj + σ
2
σ2r
(r̂ij − µj) , (4)




where σ2r = V ar [r̂ij] = σ
2 + σ2ε . Hence the return bank i receives from lending to






Similarly we know that private signals for bank j will also affect our assessment of
bank k’s signal about bank j due to the correlation between the two signals:
µkj|ij = E [r̂kj|r̂ij] = µj + σ
2
σ2r
(r̂ij − µj) , (6)











Finally we can easily verify following Johnson & Kotz (1970) that the correlation





This correlation can now be used to determine the joint distribution of rkj|ij and
rj|i.
3.2 Updating beliefs from lending decisions
In addition to the private signal, banks can also extract information from the behav-
ior of other banks, i. e. whether they lend or not to a specific bank. This decision
will reveal partially the private signal the other bank has received and can be taken
into account when assessing one’s own lending decision. A bank will only lend if
Uij ≥ 0 as for non-lending we have that due to aij = 0 it is Uij = 0.
Once the information from the private signal has been assessed as in the previous
section, banks will assess the information available from other banks’ lending deci-
sions separately. The following lemma provides the results of these considerations:
Lemma 1. Observing the decision of another bank k to lend to bank j, the assess-






















































. Similarly we can get those moments for the case
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) − γ − µkj|ij
σkj|ij
 ,
Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of the moments of truncated nor-
mal distributions, where we note from (1) that Ukj > 0 is equivalent to r̂kj > γ if
we replace µij with µj|i and σij with σj|i.
Based on this lemma we can thus determine the expected returns and variance of
bank j as assessed by bank i:
µij =
{
µ̂ij|k if akj = 1




σ̂ij|k if akj = 1
σ̂ij|−k if akj = 0
.
These expressions can now be inserted into equation (1) to assess the utility of bank
i from lending to bank j. As this utility will depend on the behavior of another
bank, k, we will rewrite this utility as Uij(akj). The coming section will now discuss
how the equilibrium in this model can be determined for the special case of N = 3.
4 Determination of equilibria in a three-bank sys-
tem
In the coming sections we will restrict our analysis to a banking system with three
banks. While such a restriction seems unrealistic for most actual banking systems, it
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Conditions Probability Strategy




2 Uij(0) > 0, Uij(1) > 0 1− Φ( r̂ij|−k−µσ2+σ2ε ) lending






4 Uij(0) > 0 and Uij(1) < 0 0 anti-following
Table 1: Strategies for bank i lending to bank j
allows us to provide a complete characterisation of the possible equilibrium lending
structures and gain some generalizable insights into interbank markets. The number
of possible network structures is 2N(N−1) and thus for N = 3 consists of 64 potential
equilibria to consider while for N = 4 this becomes an untractable 4096 potential
equilibria.
4.1 Individual lending strategies
As we can see from equation (11), the expected returns and risks of bank i lending
to bank j depend on the behavior of the remaining bank, k. Banks will lend if the
expected utility from doing so exceeds the expected utility from not lending, with
the former given by equation (1) and the latter easily being verified to be zero by
inserting aij = 0. We can now investigate the different potential outcomes in the
lending decision of bank i towards bank j. If Uij(0) < 0 and Uij(1) < 0, then the
bank will not lend as regardless of the behavior of the other bank as the expected
utility from doing so is negative. Similarly, if Uij(0) > 0 and Uij(1) > 0, then
the bank will lend as regardless of the behavior of the other bank as the expected
utility from doing so is positive. If Uij(0) < 0 and Uij(1) > 0, then the bank will
only lend if the other bank also lends as only with the information that the other
bank lends, the expected utility becomes positive. We will refer to this situation as
”bank i following bank k”. Finally, if Uij(0) > 0 and Uij(1) < 0, then the bank will
only lend if the other bank does not do so as the expected utility from doing so is
negative. We will refer to this situation as ”bank i anti-following bank k”. Table
1 summarizes these situations. We can now determine the probabilities for each of
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these situations by firstly defining
r̂ij|k ∈ {r̂ij|Uij(1) = 0} , (12)
r̂ij|−k ∈ {r̂ij|Uij(0) = 0} .
We can solve for r̂ij|k and r̂ij|−k numerically. As we can show that Uij(0) is monotonic
in r̂ij, the solution for r̂ij|−k will be unique. While Uij(1) is not monotonic in r̂ij in
general, it is so in the range of realistic parameters, such that the solution will be
unique in the relevant range. We furthermore can easily show that r̂ij|k ≤ r̂ij|−k.
Given the definition of r̂ij|k and r̂ij|−k in equation (12) it is obvious that Uij(0) < 0 is
equivalent to r̂ij < r̂ij|−k and Uij(1) < 0 corresponds to r̂ij < r̂ij|k. The probabilities
for each of the four lending strategies can now easily be determined where the ”not
lending” corresponds to Prob(r̂ij < r̂ij|k ≤ r̂ij|−k) and ”lending” has a probability of
Prob(r̂ij > r̂ij|−k ≥ r̂ij|k). The strategy ”following” has a probability of Prob(r̂ij|k <
r̂ij ≤ r̂ij|−k) and the strategy ”anti-following” corresponds to Prob(r̂ij|k > r̂ij ≥
r̂ij|−k), which is impossible as r̂ij|k ≤ r̂ij|−k and hence we can neglect this strategy.
The probabilities are shown in table 1 and the derivation is straightforward when
using the distribution of the returns from equations (2) and (3).
In order to obtain the equilibrium lending structures we will also need to consider













σ2 + σ2ε σ
2
σ2 σ2 + σ2ε
])
. (13)
Table 2 shows the possible strategy combinations and the outcome of the lending
decision which we would observe. The corresponding probabilities could easily be
derived from the joint distribution in equation (13). With these results we can now
continue to apply an algorithm to find all possible equilibria in the coming section.
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Strategy (i, j) Observed outcome (i, j)
(not lending, not lending) (not lending, not lending)
(following, not lending) (not lending, not lending)
(lending, not lending) (lending, not lending)
(not lending, following) (not lending, not lending)
(following, following) (lending, lending), (not lending, not lending)
(lending, following) (lending, lending)
(not lending, lending) (not lending, lending)
(following, lending) (lending, lending)
(lending, lending) (lending, lending)
Table 2: Strategy combinations for banks i and klending to bank j
4.2 Algorithm to determine equilibria
Each bank has three possible strategies, ”lending”, ”not lending”, and ”following”.
In a network consisting of three banks there are six possible lending decisions, hence
a total of 36 = 729 scenarios have to be considered. For each scenario we can now
determine the probability of its occurrence. Using the possible strategy combinations
from table 2 we can determine the probability for each pair of banks by applying
the joint distribution from equation (13). As ri is by assumption independently
distributed across banks, the probability of a scenario is given by the product of the
probabilities for each of the three pairs.
In a scenario those strategies that are ”lending” or ”not lending” are taken as ex-
amined because they do not depend on the action of other banks. Strategies that
are ”following” are classified as unexamined.
For each scenario we now need to determine the equilibrium outcome by applying
the following steps:
1. All examined strategies are fixed at that value and if there are no unexamined
strategies we have established a unique equilibrium for that scenario. If there
are unexamined strategies, we continue with the next step.
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Table 3: Multiple equilibria with unexamined strategies
relationship from bank i to bank j, then this unexamined relationship is set
to the same value as the examined relationship and marked itself as examined
and we have established a unique equilibrium for this scenario. If there are
any more unexamined strategies, we continue with the final step.
3. If banks i and k both follow a strategy of ”following” for lending to bank j, then
multiple equilibria will occur, namely both ”following” or both ”not following”.
Depending on how many pairs of banks have unexamined strategies, the type
and number of equilibria are different and shown in table 3. We assume that
each of the possible equilibria has an equal probability of occurrence.
Having now determined the equilibria for each scenario and calculated their prob-
abilities, we now have to aggregate those probabilities for networks that are ob-
servationally identical. We thus have established a probability distribution for the
equilibria and we can instantly see that each of the 64 possible networks can be
an equilibrium network, the probability of its occurrence will vary though with the
parameters employed, namely the expected returns µi, variance σ
2, signal precision
σε and the risk aversion of the banks λi.
The following section will now evaluate the properties of the resulting equilibria,
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firstly for a homogenous banking system and then for a banking system with banks
of different expected returns.
5 Equilibrium structures
Using the procedure outlined above we can now continue to assess the interbank
lending that would emerge in equilibrium. We will assess how key variables affect
the equilibrium interbank lending behavior of banks firstly in the case of all banks
having the same expected returns and differing only in the private signals they
receive about the expected returns for lending to other banks. We will then extend
this restrictive case to incorporate banks with different returns as a more realistic
alternative.
5.1 Homogeneous banks
Let us firstly assume that the expected return of providing interbank loans to banks
is identical for all banks, i. e. ∀i : µi = µ. As the private signal banks receive
cannot be observed by other banks or an outside spectator, all banks are ex-ante
identical and the number of potential networks reduces from 64 to 16 as we can
ignore the identity of banks and aggregate networks that are therefore looking alike,
i. e. topologically equivalent.
With the aforementioned, each of these 16 interbank lending networks will be an
equilibrium for any parameter constellation, the probability of observing a specific
network will, however, vary. These probabilities of observing a specific network
structure are what we focus our subsequent analysis on. We set σ = 1 as a normal-
ization of the amount of risk in the banking system, having verified that the results
presented here are not substantially affected by this normalization. The parameters
we are varying in the following analysis are the risk aversion of banks, λi, which for
simplicity we assume to be identical across banks, i. e. ∀i : λi = λ, the expected
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returns µ, and the precision of the private signal σε.













































































































Figure 1: Probability of equilibrium network structures for varying parameters (base
case µ = 2, λ = 2.5, σr = 1.6)
Holding λ and σε constant, we firstly analyse the impact the expected return µ has
on the main equilibrium networks that emerge. Figure 1 shows the probabilities of
all 16 networks for a range of expected returns. it is obvious from the figure that
the networks that can actually be observed will be dominated by only four of the 16












Figure 2: Dominant equilibrium networks
low expected returns the empty network dominates all other equilibrium networks.
The low expected returns make the provision of interbank loans unprofitable unless
a very large positive private signal is received. Such a large private signal is very
unlikely to be received and thus anything but a non lending decision has a small
probability. Once the expected return increases, the private signal compensating
a large negative expected return becomes more likely. Furthermore the likelihood
of a following strategy increases as the private signal itself might not be sufficient
to induce lending, but in combination with the lending decision of the other bank
this might be sufficient. Hence we will slowly observe the emergence of lending to
at least one bank. As the expected return increases even more, it becomes more
and more likely that the same will become true for the private signals regarding two
banks and we observe the emergence of a third equilibrium in which two banks are
lent money. A further increase of the expected return will then make the lending to
all three banks more and more likely, first arising from following strategies and then
once the expected return is sufficiently positive also based directly on the expected
return. We note that the full network emerges only once the expected return is
significantly above zero due to the risk aversion of the banks. Once the expected
returns are sufficiently positive the entire reasoning reverses.
From this reasoning of the observed dominant equilibrium networks we see that they
are those networks that allow a following strategy as shown in table 3. The origin of
this result arises from the fact that a following strategy is the most likely observation
for expected returns that are neither too large or too small.
For positive expected returns, the likelihood of observing a full network reduces as
the risk aversion λ increases as we can see from figure 1. The reasoning is obvious: as
the risks are becoming more and more important, it does allow the private signal to
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be less and less negative in order to generate positive expected utility. For the same
reason the empty network becomes more and more likely. Once again we observe an
intermediate range with other network structures that allow for following strategies
with the same arguments as above. The main difference, however, is that as the risk
aversion increases, the empty network does not become dominant but rather the four
main network stabilise in fixed proportions. The origin of this observation is that
while a higher risk aversion reduces the expected utility of lending, the very same
consideration will also be true of the other banks, hence observing another bank
lending implies a very high private signal, making the adjustment to the expected
return and variance in lemma 3.1 more pronounced, offsetting each other in the
variance and expected return and thereby causing the stability of the probabilities
of equilibrium network structures as the risk aversion increases.
Looking at the impact of the total risk, σr, on the probability of observing specific
equilibrium networks, we observe a similar pattern as in the case of increasing risk
aversion. The reason here is firstly along the same lines as with risk aversion, but in
addition we can also see that the update of expected returns and variance reduces
as the variance of the private signal increases due to its much more limited infor-
mational content. Hence banks rely less on their private information and observing
other banks will also have limited informational value.
In summary, we find that the equilibrium network structures are dominated by four
networks that are all consistent with banks adopting a following strategy.
5.2 Banks with different returns
We now relax the assumption that the expected returns of all banks are identical
and instead focus on a situation where 0 = µ1 ≤ µ2 ≤ µ3 = 2, with other parameter
constellations showing comparable results. As the middle-ranking bank increases
its expected returns, µ2, we see from figure 3 that the empty network becomes less
likely and the full network more likely. An increase in µ2 will, ceteris paribus, make
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the lending to the middle ranking bank more attractive and thus the absence of any
lending will become less likely. Similarly the likelihood of a full network will increase.
The other two dominant networks, which are identical to the ones identified in the
homogeneous case previously, and the argument on their emergence are unchanged.




















Figure 3: Probability of equilibrium network structures for varying µ2 (λ = 2,
σr = 1.6)
Assessing the impact of changing the risk aversion of banks is shown in figure 4.
Here we observe the same properties as in the homogenous case and the results are
only varying to the extent that the incomplete non-empty networks are found. If the
mid-ranking bank has a high expected return, we observe that it receiving interbank
loans is higher and thus the probability of these network structures is increased
accordingly. The same observation we also make when analysing the effect a change
of the risk has on the observed network structures as in figure 5.
We can thus conclude that the introduction of heterogeneity in the banks’ expected
returns does not affect the outcome substantially and the results obtained for the ho-
mogeneous case can be shown to be robust. We will thus focus on the homogeneous
case in the following discussion of the policy implications.
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(a) Homogeneous case µi = 1




















(b) Heterogeneous case µ2 = 1




















(c) Heterogeneous case µ2 = 2




















(d) Heterogeneous case µ2 = 0
Figure 4: Probability of equilibrium network structures for varying λ (σr = 1.6)
6 Policy implications
The credit crisis 2007-08 was characterized, among other things, by the withdrawal
of interbank lending facilities of banks. Analysis showed that the uncertainty sur-
rounding the solvency of other banks made banks very cautious in advancing new
interbank loans or extending the maturity of existing arrangements. We can use
our model to explain these observations. If the risk of banks increases our model
suggests that the likelihood of networks that show less interbank lending or even
its absence become more likely, explaining the reduction in interbank lending that
was observed. This effect might have been well exacerbated by an increase in the
risk aversion of banks in times their own solvency was questioned as confirmed by
our model. Hence even without a reduction in the expected returns, due to the
questionable solvency of many banks, we should observe a reduction in interbank
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(a) Homogeneous case µi = 1





















(b) Heterogeneous case µ2 = 1





















(c) Heterogeneous case µ2 = 2





















(d) Heterogeneous case µ2 = 0
Figure 5: Probability of equilibrium network structures for varying σr (λ = 2)
lending.
From our model we can also deduct the importance of the following strategy in the
emergence or absence of interbank lending. Hence the existence of interbank lending
will to a large extend depend on expectation formation, and thus it is important to
maintain trust in the solvency of banks. A reduction in the quality of the private
signals banks have about each other will also be detrimental to the existence of
a flourishing interbank market. Any regulator might want for this reason seek to
ensure that information on a banks’ solvency is easily available as to reduce the risks
banks expose themselves to.
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7 Conclusions
We provided a model of interbank lending where banks seek to maximize expected
utility in the presence of uncertainty regarding the risks of a counterparty bank.
Banks assess the risk of other banks by relying on a public signal, their individual
private signal as well as extracting information from the lending behavior of other
banks. We showed that in equilibrium four network structures of interbank lending
dominate, the empty network (no lending), the full network (all banks lend to each
other), a network in which one bank receives interbank loans from the other banks,
and a network where two banks receive interbank loans from the other banks. These
network structures were arising mainly from a ”following” strategy in which a bank
would only lend if the other bank would also do so, providing equilibria that are
vulnerable to small shocks that can change the equilibrium structure easily.
The analysis of the model presented here was limited to banking systems with only
three banks. An extension to include more banks is in principle straightforward
but comes at the cost of significantly increased computational complexity such that
additional constraints on the network structure would have to be imposed to make
it tractable. A further extension might be that the expected returns are made
endogenous to the network structure and the exposure of the bank to interbank
loans, thus depending on the network structure itself. Using such extensions would
allow us to provide a more general equilibrium of the interbank lending network.
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Balancing Liquidity and Profitability through
Interbank Markets: Endogenous Interest Rates and
Network Structures
Di Xiao∗ Andreas Krause†
Abstract
This paper develops a model of interbank lending based on liquidity and
profitability considerations of homogeneous banks. We derive the reservation
prices of interbank lending and its properties before exploring how, due to
an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, banks engage in bilateral lending to form
an interbank network. We establish that the resulting networks exhibit
realistic properties, including a core-periphery structure. Banks in the core
and the periphery of this network do not only differ in the amounts of
interbank lending and borrowing, but also in the interest rates applied to
their transactions.
Keywords: Interbank lending, interbank network, core-periphery structure,
interbank interest rates, bilateral transactions
1 Introduction
Interbank networks have been shown to be important transmitters of financial dis-
tress and the precise structure of these networks determines the extent of any such
contagion. Given the relevance of the network structure it is important to under-
stand how these are formed as only then can regulators assess the impact of any
regulatory measures that would lead to a network structure being more robust to
any banks failing. Currently the literature on how interbank networks are formed
∗University of Bath, Department of Economics, Bath BA2 7AY, email: D.Xiao@bath.ac.uk
†University of Bath, Department of Economics, Bath BA2 7AY, email: mnsak@bath.ac.uk
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is quite limited, mostly relying on ad hoc assumptions that generate heterogeneity
among banks which then manifests itself in a core-periphery structure.
In this paper we seek to address the formation of such interbank networks by devel-
oping a theoretical model that replicates key properties observed empirically. Our
main contribution here is the introduction of a framework in which banks balance
their demands from liquidity with their desire for high profitability when reacting to
an idiosyncratic liquidity shock by engaging in bilateral transactions. The interbank
lending rates in our model are determined endogenously based on the preferences
of the individual banks. We are also able to investigate differences between banks
based on their position in the interbank network that emerge endogenously.
The absence of credit risk in our model allows us to consider the emergence of
interbank networks prior to the financial crisis 2007-2008 when credit risk between
banks was largely seen as irrelevant. With liquidity considerations being seen as
more important in the aftermath of the crisis, our model also remains relevant in
the post-crisis period. It allows us to focus on the consequences of the management of
liquidity through interbank markets, which is the primary reason for their existence
as introduced in Allen & Gale (2000).
We proceed with a review of properties of interbank networks and the existing
models of their formation in the coming section. Section 3 then introduces the
model and derives some key variables and properties of the resulting interest rates
with all proofs presented in the appendix. How we use computer experiments to
assess the interbank network structure is outlined in section 4 before section 5 focuses
on the evaluation of the key properties of these resulting interbank networks. The
determinants of a bank’s position in the network are discussed in section 6 and
section 7 concludes our findings.
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2 Literature Review
A number of studies have established some key properties of interbank lending net-
works, see e.g. Boss et al. (2004), Inaoka et al. (2004), Sorama¨ki et al. (2007), Iori
et al. (2008), Bech & Atalay (2010), amongst others. Firstly they find the interbank
network to be sparse, i. e. only a small fraction of the possible lending relationships
are actually observed. Secondly, the degree distribution (the number of lending and
borrowing relationships a bank has) exhibits a fat tail, where evidence of a power law
decay is reported in some studies. The third property commonly found is that inter-
bank lending networks exhibit “small-world” properties, hence the distance between
any two banks is small. Finally, interbank lending networks are showing dissasso-
ciativity (negative associativity), meaning that highly connected banks tend to be
connected to less highly connected banks and vice versa.
Starting with Craig & Von Peter (2014) and confirmed in Langfield et al. (2014) and
Fricke & Lux (2015), it has been established that interbank lending markets exhibit
a core-periphery structure. Here a small number of highly interconnected banks
form the core and the other banks only borrow to and lend from these core banks,
but rarely does borrowing or lending happen between periphery banks themselves.
These studies find such a structure for a variety of markets, including Germany, the
UK, the Netherlands, and the Italian e-Mid market; they establish that the core
consists of a small fraction of banks in the network.
Works by Nier et al. (2007), Gai et al. (2011), Lenzu & Tedeschi (2012), Krause &
Giansante (2012), and Teteryatnikova (2014), amongst others, show the relevance of
the network structure for the spread of bank failures and hence systemic risk. Given
this relevance of the network structure, it is of paramount importance to gain an
understanding how banks form these and what its determinants are.
While quite a few models exist to generate networks with properties as outlined
above, i. e. sparse networks with a fat tailed degree distribution, disassociativity,
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and small-world properties, this is much less commonly achieved for a core-periphery
structure. Such models are highly unsatisfactory as they are based on statistical
models rather than the actual behaviour of individuals - banks in our case - and
thus do not provide a framework to assess the impact of incentives and regulation
on the properties of interbank networks. Contributions by Farboodi (2014) and
in’t Veld et al. (2014) employed heterogeneous banks to achieve a core-periphery
structure. Specifically, Farboodi (2014) showed that banks with risky investment
opportunities will form the core, while those lacking such opportunities populate
the periphery. in’t Veld et al. (2014) require banks of different sizes to establish
such a network structure. Lux (2015), on the other hand, uses a model including
reinforcement learning to build trust among banks that leads to a core-periphery
structure based on assessed credit risk.
Similarly, Ha laj & Kok (2015) use a framework considering credit risk, but do not
report the statistical properties of the resulting interbank networks in detail. Also
based on credit risk arising from lending to non-bank counterparties is the con-
tribution by Cohen-Cole et al. (2010), while Castiglionesi & Navarro (2016) show
the emergence of a core-periphery network in the presence of such counterparty
risk. A similar framework to our model, but in OTC asset markets, is developed in
Wang (2016) where also a core-periphery structure emerges and the core is formed
of endogenously emerging dealers.
Our paper contributes to this literature on the formation of realistic interbank lend-
ing networks, including a core-periphery structure. We do so without assuming
heterogeneous banks and instead rely on the bilateral interactions of banks seeking
to balance liquidity and profitability. This neglect of credit risk allows us to un-
derstand how the interbank network establishes itself from the very purpose of its
existence, the managing of liquidity as introduced in Allen & Gale (2000).
In order to initiate trades in the interbank market, we introduce idiosyncratic shocks
to banks’ liquidity buffers. One may further explore as to what causes these liquidity
shocks. Admittedly, heterogeneity in bank size or investment opportunities can
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potentially influence the distribution of cash between banks as well. However, they
are not the only reasons why banks differ in liquidity levels. Other possible causes
also play important roles such as imbalances arises from funding withdraws, or the
use of credit lines. Thus, the assumption of random liquidity shocks is not equivalent
to that of heterogenous sizes, or differing investment opportunities. Moreover, in our
model the motive to trade differs from previous models as we highlight banks’ needs
for both liquidity and profitability. Core banks are established through bilateral
trading with observable rates that have not featured in previous models.
3 A model of interbank lending and borrowing
We seek to analyze the unsecured short-term interbank market, i. e. the overnight
market for funds between banks. This allows us, as an approximation, to neglect the
default risk associated with such interbank loans and focus on the effect of liquidity
management and profitability instead. As a consequence of considering short-term
lending and borrowing only, we can take all other parts of a bank as exogenously
given, such as the interest rates applied to loans and deposits and their sizes.
We model the preferences of banks for cash reserves and profitability, and based on
this derive the reservation prices of borrowing and lending. These prices are then
used to initiate bilateral lending agreements between banks looking to improve their
overall utility level. This section will introduce the actual model used in our analysis
of the resulting interbank market structure in the coming section.
3.1 Behaviour of individual banks
We assume a stylized balance sheet of banks i = 1, . . . , N , consisting of cash re-
serves Ri, interbank loans Li, and external loans to non-financial debtors Ci on the
asset side. The liabilities consist of external deposits by non-financial creditors Di,
interbank deposits Bi, and equity Ei. The total size of the assets is denoted by Ai.
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Bank i
Cash reserves Ri Deposits Di
Interbank lending Li Interbank borrowing Bi
Loans Ci Equity Ei
Total assets Ai Ai
Figure 1: Bank i’s stylized balance sheet
For reference this stylized balance sheet is as shown in figure 1. The inclusion of
other assets and liabilities would not alter the results of our analysis here.









Banks pay and receive interest on their balance sheet items at different rates, de-
pending on the position. rf is the risk-free interest rate at which cash reserves are
remunerated, rCi is the average rate on external loans granted and r
D
i is the average
rate on external deposits, where rDi < r
f < rCi . The average rates on interbank
lending and borrowing are denoted by rLi and r
B
















ij) denotes the interest rate of bank i lending (borrowing) the amount
Lij (Bij) to (from) bank j. We also define Li =
∑
j 6=i Lij and Bi =
∑
j 6=iBij. We
do not allow banks to lend to themselves such that Lii = Bii = 0 and obviously if




We measure a bank’s profitability by its return on equity rEi , which, assuming no
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where additional revenues and costs can be included without affecting the outcomes
reported here.
We assume that banks prefer larger cash reserves and higher profitability. The
preference for higher cash reserves can be interpreted as a protection against sudden
withdrawals of depositors or interbank lending and hence we use the liquidity ratio
ρi as a measure for the size of these cash reserves. The profitability of a bank is
measured by its return on equity rEi and naturally banks seek to maximize these
returns. These two objectives of the bank need to be balanced in the utility function,
which we assume to follow a Cobb-Douglas form:
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where γi > 0 and 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1 denotes the strength of the preferences for liquidity
relative to profitability. Banks can adjust their cash reserves in the short run only via
interbank lending and borrowing as we assume that all other balance sheet positions
are fixed.
Our approach here is similar to that of Stoll (1978) in that banks seek to optimize
their inventory holdings (cash reserve) and balance this against the profits made from
trading (return on equity). While in the original work this balance was maintained
due to the risky assets that were traded, we instead recognize the preferences of
banks for liquidity directly. However, we employ similar ideas by determining the
reservation prices (interest rates) at which banks are willing to borrow and lend
funds for a given amount and using this as the basis for a bilateral agreement. In
this context we also show how the size of the loan affects interest rates and the
differences in the reservation prices between borrowing and lending.
The motivation for the use of a utility function where banks prefer both liquidity
and profitability can be explained as follows. It is quite easy to understand why
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banks favour higher profits, yet not so to see why they seek more cash. The main
reason is that banks would like to hold more cash in response to unexpected cash
outflows and potential funding risk. Capital is a safety buffer since it covers losses
and allows banks to recover from them. However, the recent financial crisis has
shown that liquidity problems can also contribute to a bank’s distress. A bank
can still fail, even when holding assets more than sufficient to cover its liabilities,
because its assets are illiquid and its liabilities have short-term maturities. To make
matters worse, depositors and other funders may lose confidence in the bank. In
this scenario, funding risk rather than default risk is most detrimental to the bank.
Thus, we highlight the importance of the ”liquidity” buffer in our model.
It is worth pointing out that the need for liquidity buffer as a protection is strongest
when banks do not hold much cash. Thus the utility function used is relatively
weak to describe a banking system where banks are holding plentiful cash and do
not desire any more cash. However, what we intend to study in this essay is a
well functioning banking system during ”normal” times. In such a system, it is
common that banks do not hold much cash since they have abundant investment
opportunities. Therefore, we believe the utility function still fits the aim of our
study. Moreover, this disadvantage can also be partially addressed when the use
of our utility function is combined with interbank trading. The main reason why
banks are reluctant to hold extra cash is that there are opportunity costs for doing so.
Otherwise, banks may be indifferent about having more cash or not. The interbank
trading implies acquiring more cash is costly for banks. More specifically, when a
bank increases its liquidity, it has to borrow some cash from other banks at a rate
higher than risk free rate (as explained in Lemma 2), which means the bank will
see a decrease in its return on equity as a cost of holding more cash. Note that
a decrease in return on equity on its own reduces the bank’s utility. Therefore, a
clear trade-off between liquidity and return makes sure the bank substitutes one for
another only when its utility can be improved. In our model, banks with a lot of cash
actually do not increase their cash level further because at the available borrowing
rate the effect of the decrease in return outweighs that of the increase in liquidity
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buffer.
Proposition 1 (Existence of optimal cash reserves). If there is no arbitrage oppor-
tunity in the interbank lending market, then a unique optimal reserve ratio exists.
Banks with reserve ratios below (above) this level would only seek to increase in-
terbank borrowing (lending), but not both interbank lending and borrowing. Banks
holding the optimal reserve ratio would not seek any interbank lending or borrowing
unless their profitability increases.
This proposition establishes that a unique optimal reserve ratio exists and that
banks do not adjust their reserves by increasing interbank lending and interbank
borrowing simultaneously, even if by different amounts. The reasoning here is that
while such a strategy would increase the utility by obtaining the optimal reserve
ratio, the no arbitrage condition implies higher costs of borrowing, compared to
lending, thus reducing the profitability of such a strategy. Another consequence of
this proposition is that we can ensure that banks do not seek to increase their total
assets unnecessarily without the need for capital regulation.
In the special case of having no interbank lending or borrowing we can determine the
optimal reserve ratio analytically and derive its properties as shown in the following
lemma:






















Banks with a higher leverage will hold less cash reserves. This result is due to the fact
that a higher leverage implies higher profits from the differences between borrowing
and lending to external non-banks, shifting the emphasis towards higher profitability
and thus reducing cash reserves. We furthermore observe that the optimal cash
reserves are reducing in the lending rate due to the better investment opportunities
this implies; an increased deposit rate increases the costs of funding to banks and
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thus incentives banks to hold less cash in order to maintain their profitability. The
higher return on cash reserves through higher risk-free rates increases their holdings.
While the above proposition shows that banks would seek to move towards their
optimal cash holding, whether such a move is actually utility enhancing will depend
on the interest rates involved. We can now determine the interest rates at which a
bank is indifferent between no lending/borrowing conducting an interbank borrowing
(rai ) or lending (r
b
i ) of size Q. The following proposition shows these reservation
prices.
Proposition 2 (Reservation prices). If Q < Ri < Di + Bi and r
E
i > −1, the
reservation prices of bank i (rai , r
b



































The following lemma establishes that a bank charges more for lending than it is
willing to pay for borrowing and that both rates will exceed the risk free rate. The
reason that borrowing rates are above the risk free rate is that the increase in cash
reserves increases the utility, hence the borrowing costs must exceed the benefits
generated from them, the risk free rate, such that a bank is indifferent between
borrowing and not borrowing. Similarly, lending reduces the utility of a bank due
to lower cash reserves, thus they must be compensated through a lending rate higher
than the benefits of the cash reserves lost, measured by the risk free rate. Due to
the utility function used, banks suffer a utility loss from reduced cash reserves larger
than the gain from an equally sized increase, hence the lending rate is higher than
the borrowing rate. This also prevents any arbitrage opportunities for banks.
Lemma 2 (Relationship of reservation prices). We find that rf < rai < r
b
i .
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Figure 2: Illustration of change of reservation rates after a transaction.
From lemma 3 we find that larger cash reserves reduces both borrowing and lending
rates as banks are more willing to lend and less willing to borrow in this situation,
i. e. the acquisition of additional cash becomes less attractive, in accordance with
the result on inventory positions in Stoll (1978). Unlike in dealer markets, the spread
between borrowing and lending rates reduces as banks are willing to accept lower
profits from interbank lending in order to offset their suboptimal cash reserves due
to the afore mentioned asymmetry implied by the utility function. A higher leverage
allows banks to generate profits from larger quantities of borrowing to non-banks
and deposits, reducing the need to increase profitability from interbank transactions
and therefore reducing the interest rate (moving it closer to the risk free rate) and
the spread. Finally, in line with Stoll (1978) we find that larger interbank loans
require lower borrowing rates and higher lending rates, thus increasing the spread,
due to the larger impact such loans have on the cash reserves of the bank.
We can also show that if two banks agree on lending, their reservation prices change
not so much that another transaction reversing the original lending is possible. This
means that banks will not inflate their balance sheets unnecessarily with reciprocal
loans.
Lemma 4 (No lending reversal). If bank i lends to or borrows from bank j, they
would not transact with each other in the opposite direction immediately afterwards,
ceteris paribus, provided their preferences are identical.
As illustrated in figure 2, after a transaction, a lender’s reservation price for new
borrowing is lower than the borrower’s reservation rate for new lending, thus making
a reversal of the transaction through a new loan unfeasible.
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3.2 Interbank trading
As proposition 1 states that banks have no desire to engage in interbank lending
and borrowing if they hold the optimal cash reserves, we expose each bank to an
idiosyncratic liquidity shock, e.g. arising from non-bank depositors re-allocating
their holdings between banks. We ensure that the average cash reserves are the
optimal cash reserves as detailed in lemma 1. As cash reserves are restricted to be






ensuring the mean as indicated and leaving only a single parameter, β > 0, to be
freely chosen to affect the shape of the distribution.
Facing this idiosyncratic liquidity shock, banks now seek to improve their utility
by adjusting their reserve ratio as well as trying to improve their profitability. The
trading mechanism is such that no centralized market exists, but borrowing and
lending needs to be arranged bilaterally between two banks. We restrict the size
of each borrowing and lending to Q and if banks want to borrow or lend larger
quantities they can do so in multiple transactions. We assume that prices at which
banks are willing to borrow or lend are not public knowledge, but only are revealed
if another bank enquires its prices, in line with actual interbank markets. A bank i
will ask other banks randomly for the price at which they would be willing to borrow
or lend. If this price is below (above) its reservation price for borrowing (lending),
the bank will agree on an interbank loan at the price this bank has quoted. The
price a bank quotes will be the reservation price; using different pricing rules proved
to provide similar results to those reported here, e.g. seeking the average of the two
reservation prices, or quoting prices that are below/above the reservation prices.
After a transaction both banks involved update their reservation prices. The banks
then continue seeking the quote of an additional bank. A bank remembers any
past prices that have been quoted and if in light of the changed reservation prices
previous quotes become attainable these are now taken up, such that the best prices
are taken up first. This process continues until all banks have been asked for a
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quote or a maximum of N transactions have been agreed. After N transactions or
when all banks have been asked for a quote the bank will restart the process. The
process then continues to the next randomly selected bank until all banks have been
chosen. Any bank entered the market earlier can at that stage engage in additional
transactions in random order following the same rules until no further transactions
between banks are possible.
4 Model evaluation
The reservation prices of the above model and their properties can be easily derived
using proposition 2. It is, however, not easily possible to derive the properties of
the resulting interactions between banks. While we would be able to derive the
“average” properties from the resulting network of interbank lending, such as the
average degree or connectedness, the specific structure of this network which we are
interested in cannot be derived analytically. Specifically we are interested in the
emergence of a so called core-periphery structure, which consists of a small number
of highly connected banks (the core) and a large number of banks that are only
connected to banks in the core (the periphery), as well as any differences between
these two types of banks. In order to analyse the network properties, we therefore
conducted a computer experiment of the individual interactions between banks as
detailed in the model and analysed the resulting individual networks.
It is common in many models that differences between banks emerge as the result
of differences between banks, e. g. different preferences, costs, or liquidity needs.
With such heterogeneity it is not surprising to observe that banks obtain different
positions in the network. Here we are, however, interested in the emergence of
any such difference if banks are homogenous and investigate how the interactions
between individual banks shape this network structure. To this end we assume
that for each simulation run all banks are ex-ante identical by having the same
preferences (θi = θ), the same size (Ai = A), same balance sheet structure (λi = λ),
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interest rates (rCi = r
C , rDi = r
D), and no initial interbank loans (Li = Bi =
0). The only difference between banks will be the cash reserves ρi (and necessary
adjustment to the amount external loans to ensure the total assets are matching)
by introducing idiosyncratic liquidity shocks as detailed in the previous section. All
other parameters are chosen randomly for each run from a distribution as indicated
in table 1.
By assuming banks are homogenous in most aspects apart from their initial liquidity
buffers, we are not assuming heterogeneity in these aspects are not important for
the emergence of interbank network features such as the core-periphery structure.
On the contrary, we agree they play key roles in determining whether a bank is core
or not. And in real markets, banks are indeed quite heterogenous unlike what we
assume in this essay. The advantage of applying such an assumption is that the
model gives a different perspective. It allows us to explore the emergence of some
interbank network features even without heterogeneity in size or investment oppor-
tunities. Also, the model serves as a good starting point and can be easily extended
to introduce size heterogeneity based on this framework, and the emergence of a
core-periphery structure is likely to be further strengthened as a consequence, given
we show that a core-periphery structure emerges without the elements of hetero-
geneity often assumed in the previous literature, i.e. it materializes endogenously
without assumed heterogeneity in key bank properties.
For the identification of the core-periphery structure of a network, we follow Lip
(2011). The idea is to partition the network into these two groups such that the core
is maximally connected while the periphery has no connections between themselves
and only connections to this core. If we have Nc banks in the core C, a perfect
core would have Nc(Nc − 1) connections, as we do not allow for banks to lend to
themselves. The perfect periphery would have no connections with each other and
all connections would only be with the core. A formal definition of core-periphery
structures can be found in Borgatti & Everett (2000). We can now define an error
score as the difference between this perfect core-periphery structure and the actual
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U(a; b) denotes a uniform distribution with a lower limit of a and upper limit of b. Beta denotes
the beta distribution with the parameters as indicated.
Parameter Symbol Distribution
Assets A fixed at 100
Preferences θ U(0; 0.1)
Leverage λ U(2; 100)
Number of banks N U(1; 1000)
Risk free rate rf U(0.025; 0.125)
Deposit rate rD U(0; 0.025)
Loan rate rC U(rf ; 0.2)
Interbank loan size Q U(0; 2)
Distribution of liquidity β U (1− ρ∗; 9(1− ρ∗))





Table 1: Parameter selection for simulations
connections, ECC for the errors in the core and EPP in the periphery. Any non-
existent connections between the core and periphery are ignored. If we denote a
dummy variable cij that takes a value of 1 if bank i gives an interbank loan to bank
j and zero otherwise, we obtain








The total error score is then given by
E(C) = ECC + EPP∑
i,j cij
(11)
and the core determined such that
C∗ ∈ arg minE(C). (12)
It is common to identify an error score of below 0.5 with a core periphery structure.
For interbank networks empirically an error score in the region of 0.3 is commonly
found. Other algorithms as developed in Holme (2005) or Da Silva et al. (2008) lead
to similar results.
Using a total of 10,000 banking systems, we can now evaluate the properties of the
resulting networks in the coming two sections. Some computer experiments will
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Parameter constellation: θ = 0.0280, Q = 1.4424, N = 95, 1λ = 0.0347, r
f = 0.0517, rD = 0.0234,
rC = 0.0953, β = 9.0478. The largest component shown consists of 91 banks and has 4 core
banks.
Figure 3: Visualization of an interbank network structure
produce too few interbank loans or the number of banks is too small to for a core-
periphery structure to emerge. We will exclude such networks from our analysis and
investigate only the largest connected component, i. e. exclude those banks that
engage in neither interbank borrowing or lending.
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5 Emergence of a core-periphery structure
Conducting computer experiments as outlined in the previous section, we can easily
see from figure 3 a core-periphery structure with the four inner banks forming the
core. This sample result gives us a clear indication that core-periphery structures
emerge in our model from the interactions between banks. A more thorough statisti-
cal analysis of this result using all computer experiments is shown in the histograms
of figure 4 and the descriptive statistics in tables 2 and 3.
We can see clearly from these descriptive statistics and histograms that the vast
majority of interbank networks exhibit a core periphery structure. While not all
networks will exhibit realistic properties consistent with actual interbank lending
networks, including a core-periphery structure, it is clear that these properties easily
emerge, even when banks are homogenous, apart from the size of the idiosyncratic
liquidity shock. The core size is low as in all real interbank networks.
We also see that the networks exhibit other realistic properties that are commonly
found, namely a low density, i.e. only relatively few banks are lending to each
other, a strongly negative assortativity, fat tails of the degree distribution and short
average path lengths. The clustering coefficient is relatively low, though, compared
to real interbank markets, but we note that for networks with a low error score,
i. e. a more pronounced core-periphery structure, this measure actually increases
and moves into a more realistic range. Figure 5 shows these relationships and we see
that as the error score approaches realistic levels of approximately 0.2-0.3, see Craig
& Von Peter (2014) and Fricke & Lux (2015), all other reported network measures
also reach levels that are consistent with those reported for actual interbank lending
networks.
Banks in the core are borrowing at lower rates than those in the periphery and are
lending at higher rates. Looking at table 2, we see that periphery banks lend to core
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(c) Assortativity between in-degrees


















(d) Assortativity between out-degrees
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(e) Average shortest path















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(d) Average shortest path length
Figure 5: Scatter plots of network measures against the error score
banks lending to them. The interest rates between banks in the core and periphery,
respectively, are falling between these extremes.
We also clearly can see from table 3 that banks in the core are much more active
in the interbank market than banks in the periphery as evidenced by their higher
interbank borrowing and lending as well as higher leverage. At the same time we
observe that banks in the core hold fewer cash reserves than banks in the periphery,
suggesting the increased leverage does not result in an equally increased cash reserve
but instead banks seeking a higher return. Not surprisingly, therefore, banks in the
core show a higher return on equity and an improved utility level. It is thus that
being in the core is beneficial, but it is also clear that banks selected to participate
in the interbank market early, are more likely to end up in the core.
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This table shows the estimates of a OLS regression to study the emergence of core periphery
structure. The three dependent variables describe or relate to the core periphery structure, which
are ERROR SCORE, CORE SIZE and CORE CENTRALITY. The independent variables are all
the exogenous parameters in our model. We show estimates of these regressions and do not report
t-values as due to the sample size of 10,000 all estimates are statistically significant. We report
the R2 statistics for each regression.
log(Error score) log(Core size) log(Core centrality)
Constant 2.4514 2.1173 −1.1739
log(θ) 0.8583 0.1103 0.0338
log(Q) −0.2949 −0.6082 0.3558
log(N) −0.2909 −0.8503 −0.4926
1
λ 3.8407 −0.6581 0.8731
β 0.0481 −0.0685 0.0356
rf 12.1977 0.4171 1.2962
rD −1.9401 −0.8948 −0.2026
rC −8.9183 −0.6399 −0.8429
R2 0.7502 0.8648 0.8310
Table 4: OLS regression for the determinants of core periphery structure
Given the large number of free parameters in our model, we also conducted a regres-
sion analysis of the results as detailed in table 4. Given the sample size of 10,000
computer experiments, the statistical significance of the estimates are not meaning-
ful. 1 We see that the core-periphery structure becomes more pronounced, i. e. a
lower error score is shown, if banks put less emphasis on liquidity concerns (θ) as
being active in the interbank market is a prerequisite for the emergence of a core.
Focusing on profitability makes banks borrow and lend repeatedly and thus establish
themselves in the core. The implied emphasis on profitability in banks with a higher
leverage (λ) has a similar effect, although it increases rather than reduces the core
size due to the market being dominated by fewer banks and increases its centrality.
More banks (N) enable the establishment of a core more easily as it allows for more
transactions between banks, facilitating for core banks to emerge. This core is then
smaller, relative to the number of banks, however this comes at the cost of the cen-
trality of this core. Using larger interbank loans (Q) leads to better core-periphery
structures as the lower number of transactions will be more concentrated and thus
1We note, however, that the R2 in all regressions is considerable, indicating a good fit of the
regression overall. As all explanatory variables are chosen exogenously we can discard the problem
of endogeneity and in Appendix B show that our results are robust for multicollineraity.
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(a) Core-Core lending rates


























(b) Core-Periphery lending rates


























(c) Periphery-Core lending rates

























(d) Periphery-Periphery lending rates
Figure 6: Dependence of the interbank lending rate on θ
allowing for less lending between banks in the periphery. This also reduces the size
of the core while increasing its centrality. The impact of the interest rates are such
that they make the focus of the banks on profitability more or less pronounced and
thus affect the extent banks engage in interbank lending and borrowing, influencing
the emergence of a core.
Furthermore, lending rates by banks in the core are lower if banks have stronger
preferences for cash. This relationship is only strong for very low values of θ, though.
The opposite effect can be observed for banks in the periphery, it is however much
more restricted to very low values of θ as we can see from figure 6.
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6 Banks’ positions within the interbank lending
network
After having established that the structure of the interbank network shows clear
signs of a core-periphery structure with these groups of banks exhibiting clearly
different properties, we can now also assess, based on the model developed above as
well as the simulations, how individual banks are affected. Our analysis is summa-
rized in figure 7. We start with the only two exogenous variables in our model that
distinguish banks from each other, the initial liquidity shock and the timing at which
the bank enters the interbank market. It is relatively straightforward to see that the
larger this liquidity shock, the deviation from the optimal cash reserves, the more
banks are willing to lend due to excess cash reserves and the less they are willing to
borrow. The opposite will be true for negative liquidity shocks. Therefore, larger
liquidity shocks will generally induce a bank to become more active in the interbank
market. A bank entering the interbank market early will have more opportunities
to be engaged in trading as more banks subsequently enter the market. Therefore
increased participation in the interbank market makes it more likely that a bank
has many connections with other banks and is thus more likely to be found to be in
the core.
The cash reserves are increased from lending and reduced from borrowing. With
an increase in the amount of borrowing and lending, the overall incentives are such
that the cash reserves are falling, with banks having a clear incentive to use their
lower reservation prices to lend some of the cash and generate additional profits that
increase their utility level, partly offsetting the resulting lower cash reserves through
additional borrowing at even lower rates. Any increase in borrowing will obviously
increase the leverage of the bank. As we have seen in the discussion of the model,
banks with higher leverage have lower reservation prices for interbank lending and
borrowing, and the difference between them reduces.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Relationships between variables
its from their borrowing and lending, more than offsetting the effect of a smaller
spread. With core banks lending mostly to periphery banks that have higher reser-
vation prices and lower reservation prices for borrowing due to the larger spread as
a result of their lower leverage, they are able to maintain their profit margins and
thus generate larger returns. The result is that the higher returns more than offset
the lower levels of cash reserves, thus increasing the overall level of utility of banks
in the core.
As indicated some of these results can be derived directly from the model, others can
be derived from the computer experiments. We show a few selected regression results
using our only exogenous variables in table 5. As we can see from the descriptive
statistics above, some results show clear outliers and we have addressed these by
also investigating robust regressions, quantile regressions, winsorizing, as well as
trimming of data and found the results to be robust. We clearly see the importance
of the order in which banks enter the market (Order) for them being in the core and
having a high final leverage. Similarly, a large shock, either negative or positive,
increases the likelihood of being in the core due to the amount of transaction such
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banks engage him to offset this shock, but reduces the final leverage as banks are
more concerned about offsetting this shock than borrowing and lending in equal
parts. We can see this from the impact on net lending where the size of the shock
is most important but the order of market entry has no meaningful impact.
7 Conclusions
We developed a model of interbank lending that balanced the liquidity and prof-
itability concerns of banks. Deriving reservation prices for borrowing and lending as
well as their properties we then showed how the bilateral interactions between banks
gave rise to a core-periphery structure of the resulting interbank network, besides
other realistic properties. Finally we considered the properties of banks in the core
and periphery as well as the determinants of a bank’s position in these. In doing
so we noted that core banks tend to lend at higher and borrow at lower rates than
banks in the periphery. Furthermore, banks that enter the market early or face a
larger liquidity shock are most likely to become core banks.
By deriving realistic properties of the interbank lending network in the absence of
credit risk we can show that the observed properties are the result primarily of
bilateral transactions between banks rather than any differences in their ex-ante
properties. As Cohen-Cole et al. (2010), Ha laj & Kok (2015), Lux (2015), and
Castiglionesi & Navarro (2016) showed the emergence of core-periphery structures in
the presence of counterparty risk and Farboodi (2014) and in’t Veld et al. (2014) for
heterogeneous banks, our results suggest this to be a universal property of interbank
lending markets.
The model presented here is very minimal in that it only considers banks differing in
an exogenous liquidity shock and the time of their market entry. We do not consider
the credit risk arising in such a setting; it is obvious that any bank in the core with
its higher leverage would have a higher credit risk. We leave the exploration of this
aspect for future research. Also, the interbank market cannot be seen in isolation
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from the monetary operations of central banks that will supply or withdraw liquidity
in the banking system. How such operations affect interbank lending is beyond the
scope of this paper and therefore left for future consideration.
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The cash level after any transaction must be non-negative, i.e.
Ri + ∆Ri = ∆Bi −∆Li + Ei + Di + Bi −Ci − Li ≥ 0,
where ∆Li ≥ 0 and ∆Bi ≥ 0. Hence
ρi(∆Bi,∆Li) =
Ri + ∆Bi −∆Li
Di + Bi + ∆Bi
,
rEi (∆Bi,∆Li) = r
E
i,0 +
(rLi − rf )∆Li + (rf − rBi )∆Bi
Ei
,
where rEi,0 denotes the return on equity prior to the transaction. The utility maxi-






subject to ∆Bi ≥ 0,
∆Li ≥ 0,
∆Bi −∆Li + Ei + Di + Bi −Ci − Li ≥ 0.
To prove this proposition, we need to show that the above problem has a unique
solution. The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is
L = Ui(ρi(∆Bi,∆Li), rEi (∆Bi,∆Li))





+ λ1 + λ3 = 0,
∂Ui
∂∆Li







∆Bi −∆Li + Ei + Di + Bi −Ci − Li ≥ 0,
λ3 ≥ 0,
λ3(∆Bi −∆Li + Ei + Di + Bi −Ci − Li) = 0.













Li + Ci − Ei + ∆Li











Bi + ∆Bi + Di















∆Bi −∆Li + Ei + Di + Bi −Ci − Li







as ∆Bi − ∆Li + Ei + Di + Bi − Ci − Li ≥ 0 and rLi − rBi < 0 arising from the
non-arbitrage interbank market rates as shown below.
Combining these results we find that λ1 + λ2 ≥ 0. Using the other Kuhn-Tucker
conditions we can distinguish between three cases:
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i = 0, which is a unique
solution. This corresponds to the case that bank i’s interbank positions are
already optimal.
2. If λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0 we find that ∆B
∗





(∆L∗i ) = 0.
Such ∆L∗i must exist since the second constraint is non binding and it is unique
as the utility function is concave in ∆L∗i . This corresponds to the case that
bank i is to increase interbank lending.
3. If λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0 we find that ∆L
∗





(∆B∗i ) = 0.
Such ∆B∗i must exist since the first constraint is non binding and it is unique
as the utility function is concave of ∆B∗i . This corresponds to the case that
bank i is to increase interbank borrowing.
The last step is to show the utility function is concave in ∆Bi and ∆Li. We need
only to check the second derivatives are negative, ∂
2Ui
∂∆B2i
< 0 and ∂
2Ui
∂∆L2i
< 0, as the












































































Li + ∆Li + Ci − Ei




= −2Li + ∆Li + Ci − Ei





























To determine the reservation prices of a borrowing or lending, we require that the
utilities before and after a transaction are identical, i. e. Ui(ρi, r
E





i ) = Ui(ρi,L, r
E
i,L), where the subscript B and L denote borrowing and
lending, respectively.
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i Li + r
fRi − rDDi − rBi Bi
Ei
.
After a transaction these variables become
ρi,B =
Ri +Q















Q(rbi − rf )
Ei
.











Di + Bi +Q
)θi (
1 + rEi +




which can easily be seen to solve for




















































which gives the rate for interbank lending.
A.3 Lemma 1










subject to Ri + Ci = Di + Ei = Ai.
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i + 1) + (r
C
i − rDi )
rCi − rf
,
from which we easily see that
∂ρ∗i
∂λi





(λi − 1)2 < 0.










(rCi − rf )2
(
rDi − rf −
Ei
Di




























1−θi > 0, the first inequality reduces to 1 >
1
1+qi
(1 + qiηi) which is trivially
fulfilled as ηi < 1.





















, which obviously is not negative.
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A.5 Lemma 3























1−θi − 1 > 0,




f + gai fi,
rbi = r
f + gbifi.



























































































































































Ai − Qρi λiλi−1
< 0.















































< 0, fi > 0, and g
b
















































Ai − Qρi λiλi−1
> 1,
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The second derivatives of gai and g
b








1− θi (1− g
a
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Consider the transaction between two banks, denoted 1 and 2. Before transactions,
bank i has reservation rates rai and r
b
i , respectively. In order for a transaction to
happen, it has to be either ra1 ≥ rb2 or rb1 ≤ ra2 . Without loss of generality, we assume
that rb1 ≤ ra2 , so bank 1 lends to bank 2. The actual agreed interest rate rtr has to
satisfy rb1 ≤ rtr ≤ ra2 . After this transaction, bank 1 has reservation rates (ra1,L, rb1,L)
and bank 2 has reservation rates (ra2,B, r
b





make sure bank 1 would not borrow from bank 2.
Noting that due to the assumption that banks have identical preferences we have
θ1 = θ2 = θ, after the transaction of size Q the reservation prices are given by



















+ rtr − rf
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+ rtr − rf
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)− rtr − rf) .
We denote the transaction price by a linear combination of rb1 and r
a
2 such that with
0 ≤ ω ≤ 1
rtr − rf = ω(rb1 − rf ) + (1− ω)(ra2 − rf ),
and further define 0 < p ≤ 1 implicitly by





Combining these two equations we obtain










We can rewrite equation (13) using this notation as
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− (pω + 1− ω)
(ra2 − rf)
and obtain using (14)
























)− ω + 1− ω
p
(rb1 − rf) ,



















− (pω + 1− ω)
− (pω + 1− ω)

× (ra2 − rf) .
Now we need only to show the above equations to be negative and positive, respec-














































− pω + 1− ω
− pω + 1− ω > 0.
After some transformations we can easily see that these relationships hold.
B Appendix: Robustness for multicollineraity
For regressions in table 4, since the values of these independent variables are de-
termined exogenously, dependent variables such as error score, core size or core
centrality cannot influence their values. Therefore, there cannot exist an endogene-
ity issue in these regressions. We also consider the possibility of multicollinearity
affecting the R2 by investigating the correlation matrix given as below. We find
the correlation between any two independent variables to be quite weak (no more
than 0.25 and in many cases less than 0.1). This is consistent with the setting of
our experiments as these independent variables are randomly and independently as-
signed. The only exception is the correlation between rf and rC which is moderate
at 0.4854. This is expected since rC is set as rf plus an random amount in order
to make sure rC is over rf within reasonable range. We also tried an alternative
regression that does not include rf as an independent variable in table 7 and find
it produces a similar result as the original regression. Specifically, estimates in the
alternative regression have the same sign and similar values as the original, and the
R2 is not much affected either. Our analysis suggests the high level of R2 of the

































































































































































































log(Error score) log(Core size) log(Core centrality)
Constant 2.6942 2.1256 −1.1481
log(θ) 0.7791 0.1076 0.0254
log(Q) −0.2895 −0.6080 0.3563
log(N) −0.2936 −0.8504 −0.4929
1
λ 3.4587 −0.6712 0.8325
β 0.0260 −0.0692 0.0332
rD −2.1083 −0.9005 −0.2205
rC −5.6842 −0.5293 −0.4993
R2 0.6634 0.8646 0.8284
Table 7: OLS regression as in table 4 with rf excluded.
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Bank Demand for Central Bank Liquidity: The
Impact of Bid Shading and Interbank Markets
Di Xiao∗ Andreas Krause†
Abstract
We develop a model in which banks bid for liquidity provided by the central
bank in fixed and variable rate auctions, considering liquidity injections and
extractions as well as the impact of a subsequent interbank market. We derive
the equilibrium demands of banks establishing the prevalence of bid shading
and show that fixed and variable rate tenders lead to the same allocation in
equilibrium. We also investigate the impact the central bank auction has on
the subsequent interbank market and find that while lending in the interbank
market is reduced, the interest rates are moving in the desired direction. The
impact of monetary policy on banks located in the core and the periphery of
the interbank network are different.
Keywords: Central bank operation, multi-unit auction, fixed rate auction,
variable rate auction, interbank network, core-periphery network
1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis 2007/8 central banks around the world
provided banks with significant amounts of liquidity to counter the freeze in the
interbank market, but also in order to maintain low interest rates. There has been
considerable effort to assess the impact this liquidity injection had on the lending
behaviour of banks and the wider economy, see e. g. Bernanke & Blinder (1992),
Sims (1992), Kashyap & Stein (2000), Ehrmann et al. (2001), Rudebusch & Wu
(2008), and Carpenter et al. (2014), but what has received very little attention,
∗University of Bath, Department of Economics, Bath BA2 7AY, email: D.Xiao@bath.ac.uk
†University of Bath, Department of Economics, Bath BA2 7AY, email: mnsak@bath.ac.uk
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however, is the impact this monetary policy had on the interbank market struc-
ture. Understanding this link between monetary policy and interbank markets is
paramount also to assess the impact of such monetary policy on systemic risk but
also how the reversal of the very loose monetary policy affects banks.
This paper seeks to address the question of the banks’ demand for central bank
liquidity and how it impacts on the interbank market. We will consider the strategic
behaviour of banks when bidding for central bank liquidity, and also include the
impact of an interbank market for liquidity on this behaviour. The importance of
the interbank market for systemic risk has been explored in Freixas et al. (2000),
Allen & Gale (2000), Furfine (2003), Battiston et al. (2012), Georg (2013), and
Acemoglu et al. (2015), amongst others. In these contributions it has become clear
that the structure of the interbank market affects the level of systemic risk. Most
notably Fricke & Lux (2015), Craig & Von Peter (2014), and Langfield et al. (2014)
have established that the interbank market exhibits a core-periphery structure, i. e.
a small number of banks are highly interconnected and form the core while the vast
majority of banks only connect to this core but not other banks in this periphery.
This paper will explore how monetary policy affects the structure of the interbank
market as well as interest rates in interbank markets.
One important feature of our model is that banks have preference for both liquidity
and returns. In other words, we assume just as banks seek to maximize profitability,
illiquidity is also undesirable. Consequently, banks in our model face an internal
trade off between these two objectives when maximizing utility. This is unlike other
comparable studies where banks only optimize returns but are essentially indifferent
about their liquidity level. It also has important implications for the modelling of
the demand for central bank funds and the resulting equilibrium.
In our paper we consider monetary policy in form of the auction of short term cen-
tral bank funds prior to the commencement of the interbank market. The central
bank may choose to implement either liquidity injection or liquidity extraction via
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auctions to conduct their monetary policy, the extent of which is determined exoge-
nously. Banks face an idiosyncratic liquidity shock leading to different valuations of
liquidity and subsequently different bid schedules for central bank funds. Any de-
mand for liquidity that is not met by the central bank through their auction facility
can in a second step be offset in the interbank market. Thus our model combines
in a new way the demand for liquidity in central bank operations with that of the
interbank market and shows the interactions between these two facilities.
We continue as follows: the following section provides a brief overview of the relevant
literature, while section 3 details the model for the demand of central bank funds
and section 4 assesses the results of our model in the interbank market. Finally
section 5 concludes our findings. All proofs are provided in the appendix.
2 Literature Review
The focus of our model is on the short-term funding provided by the central bank to
commercial banks. This a wide range of mechanisms are employed around the world,
most notably open-market purchases by the US Federal Reserve, the mechanism
that provides the basis of our model is most closely resembling that of the European
Central Bank (ECB). The ECB uses a system of repurchase agreements with a
maturity of one week. To allocate the funding in these repurchase agreements the
ECB conducts them either in fixed rate or variable rate tenders, where in fixed rate
tenders the ECB specifies the interest applicable and banks bid for the volume they
want to obtain at these conditions with the bank allocating the amounts subject
to a global limit on the provision of liquidity. In contrast to that, in variable rate
tenders the ECB specifies the total quantity of liquidity to be supplied and banks
submit a bid schedule specifying the amount and interest rate they are requesting,
subject to a minimum interest rate and a maximum number of ten different bids.
In all cases banks have to provide collateral and be financially stable.
Until June 2000 the ECB used only fixed rate tenders and subsequently changed to
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variable rate tenders until October 2008. After this date in response to the financial
crisis the ECB reversed to fixed rate tenders and allowed banks to bid for and be
allocated unlimited amounts, provided it has sufficient collateral and is financially
stable. The ECB also operates a more long term provision of liquidity to banks for
the duration of three months, also by variable or fixed rate tenders. For more details
on the operation of the ECB’s operation of monetary policy see European Central
Bank (2011).
2.1 Central bank operation using auctions
Despite the importance of auctions to provide liquidity to banks, the literature inves-
tigating these mechanisms either theoretically or empirically are relatively limited.
Nautz & Oechssler (2003) introduce a model of banks strategically bidding in a fixed
rate tender where banks minimise the deviations between the liquidity acquired in
the auction and the liquidity they desire. Although they find the resulting game
does not have an equilibrium, they also demonstrate that banks increasingly exag-
gerate their demand with an adaptive bidding rule. Ayuso & Repullo (2003) extend
this model by including an expectation of interbank market rates, assuming the
interbank market to be efficient. Furthermore they assume that the central bank
minimises a loss function of the difference between the interbank rate and a target
policy rate, and find that if the loss function punishes more heavily when interbank
rate move below rather than above the target (which has similar effect as rationing),
fixed rate tenders have a unique equilibrium with high overbidding.
Nyborg & Strebulaev (2003) take a different approach that allows for a brief squeeze
in the interbank market commencing after the auction. They also differ from the
above model as they assume banks to maximize interest earnings. They find that
pre-auction positions can affect a bidder’s behaviour in equilibrium. Specifically,
bidders with short positions tend to bid more aggressively due to the concern of
experiencing a loss of access to sufficient liquidity in the interbank market. Ewerhart
et al. (2010) take an alternative approach, assuming collateral to be heterogeneous
92
and central bank funds supply to be uncertain. Banks with a goal to maximize
interest earnings can either get the liquidity in the auction or alternatively in the
interbank market at a cost of putting up more expensive collateral. In equilibrium,
their model also predicts bid shading, i. e. the submission of bids that do not reflect
their true preferences. While this model is close to ours as it uses a private value
for liquidity. However, our model differs substantially in that they assume a bank’s
valuation for funds is based on the cost of using collateral while our model will be
driven by the desire of a high profitability and high liquidity.
Empirically a number of properties have been found that a model of such auctions
should capture: overbidding, bid shading and flat bids. Overbidding, i. e. requesting
more funds than required in anticipation of rationing, is observed empirically in
fixed rate tenders with (possible) rationing, as shown in Ayuso & Repullo (2003)
and Nautz & Oechssler (2003). They also found the switch by the ECB from fixed
rate to variable tenders mitigated overbidding without losing much control over
interbank rates.
Bid shading is when banks submit bids for liquidity that do not fully reflect their
true preferences. They will submit bids that show a lower willingness to pay for a
given quantity than their preferences would imply in order to improve their utility
from this auction. Empirically bid shading is usually measured by the differences
between the auction rate and subsequent interbank market rate. The evidence on
bid shading is mixed and depends on the sample period and the index of interbank
market rates used. For instance, Ayuso & Repullo (2003) use the 1-week Euribor
and Eonia on the day of settlement of the central bank operation. For both fixed and
variable rate tenders the interbank rate is 3 (Eonia) or 4 (Euribor) basis points above
the average tender rate and the latter is significant. Bindseil et al. (2009) use swap
rates 15 minutes before auctions and find them 3.33bp higher than the weighted
average bid and 1.64 bp higher than the weighted average winning bid. In contrast,
Nautz & Oechssler (2003) use Eonia on the day of announcement of the central bank
operation and find it to be very close to the marginal rate of the ECB’s variable
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rate tender. Therefore they argue the difference is not empirically relevant and
the small difference could be due to differences in collateral requirements. Cassola
et al. (2013) cover the height of the financial crisis in 2007 and find that the spread
between bank bids and Eonia is 4bp on average. Moreover, they find that after the
financial crisis this spread increases to 10 basis points. They argue that the central
bank operation resembles an auction of a common value good where bidders have
private information. The interbank market rate is viewed as this ”common value” of
liquidity. Bidders strategically shade their bids to avoid the ”winner’s curse” in this
auction and thus bid shading would increase with uncertainty about the common
value. However, Bindseil et al. (2009) find no support for this in empirical evidence,
suggesting this framework may not fit central bank operations.
In the ECB’s variable rate tender a bank can submit a bid schedule of up to 10
bids, but banks seldom utilize all of them. The average number of bids is 2 to 3 and
the bid schedule is quite flat as reported in Bindseil et al. (2009) and Cassola et al.
(2013). The average winning tender rate is only 1.7bp above the marginal tender
rate according to Ayuso & Repullo (2003).
There have also been a small number of investigations on the relationship between
central bank auctions for liquidity and the interbank market. Brunetti et al. (2010)
and Linzert & Schmidt (2011) have shown that in the Euro zone area, prior to the
crisis period of 2007/8, central bank interventions are usually reducing interbank
spreads. For the US, where the Federal Reserve used a term auction facility for
maturities of one to three months in response to the financial crisis 2007/8, McAn-
drews et al. (2017) and Wu (2008) find that liquidity injections reduce the interbank
spread, even if excluding the credit risk associated with interbank markets. Taylor
& Williams (2009) find the opposite effect, but McAndrews et al. (2017) suggest
their model is incorrectly specified.
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2.2 Multi-unit auction theory
The theoretical framework for the demand for central bank funds through auctions
is auction theory. As banks can request different amounts of liquidity, the auctions
are for multiple units, hence theories of auctions of a perfectly divisible good are
the appropriate theoretical framework. Such a multi-unit auction problem was first
studied by Wilson (1979), where a known number of symmetric bidders bid for
shares of an item of common value. He first considers uniform pricing and discusses
cases where the item value is certain and where it is not. He also discuss cases where
bidders have proprietary information and where they have not. In all these cases,
he finds that there is some equilibrium where the sale price of the item is a lot lower
than if the auction is a single-unit auction. In other words, in such an equilibrium
a bidder’s strategy is not to reveal their true value of the item (bid shading). On
the contrary, bidders can ”collusively”’ shade their true demand and be better off.
It is worth mentioning, in a single-unit auction of a good of common value there is
also an incentive for bidders to shade their bids when bidders have a noisy signals
of the good’s value. This is because the bidder who wins the auction must have a
signal that is the highest value and can still win by paying a bit less (the ”winner’s
curse”) and thus it is not optimal to bid according to one’s signal.
The results from Wilson (1979) have been generalized in Back & Zender (1993)
and alternative information settings been applied in Back & Zender (2001). A
framework of private value goods instead of common value goods has also been
investigated. For instance, the split award procurement auction is studied in both a
complete information setting in Anton & Yao (1989) and an incomplete information
setting by Anton & Yao (1992). There are also a number of studies that consider
endogenous supply and find it helps to reduce bid shading, e. g. Klemperer & Meyer
(1989) and Back & Zender (2001). A major topic in this area is the comparison
between uniform and discriminatory pricing mechanism (comparable to fixed and
variable rate tenders in our model) in terms of which is optimal, e.g. Tenorio (1997),
Back & Zender (2001), or Ausubel et al. (2014). Studies on treasury auctions in
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Binmore & Swierzbinski (2000), Abbink et al. (2006), Goldreich (2007), Hortac¸su
& McAdams (2010), and Kang & Puller (2008) as well as electricity markets by
Federico & Rahman (2003) and Fabra et al. (2006) also continue the debate from
auction theory. However, the general finding is inconclusive as the results depend on
the detailed assumptions about bidders and the auction mechanism itself as pointed
out in Ausubel et al. (2014).
3 A model of central bank borrowing
We consider a banking system with N > 2 banks where each bank i seeks to maxi-
mize its utility, which consists of two elements. Firstly banks seek to maximize their
profitability measured by the return on equity. Using the stylized balance sheet of





i −QirCBi +CirCi −DirDi −BirBi
Ei
, (1)
where rf is the risk free rate, rLi is the weighted average rate on interbank lending,
rCBi is the average rate on central bank funds, r
C
i is the average rate on external
asset, rDi is the average rate paid on external deposit, r
B
i is the weighted average rate
on interbank borrowing, and Qi is the amount of central bank funds with positive
numbers indicating a loan from the central bank a negative number a deposit at the
central bank.
Secondly, banks will seek to hold large cash reserves as that allows them to withstand
any large withdrawals of deposits without having to resort to costly asset liquidation
or declare themselves illiquid. We define the cash reserve ratio as
ρi =
Ri
Di +Bi + max {0, Qi} . (2)
Obviously large cash reserves reduce profitability as the interest paid on these will
be smaller than on other investment opportunities. To balance these two aspects
















Cash reserves Ri Deposits Di
Interbank lending Li Interbank borrowing Bi
Central bank deposit max {0,−Qi} Central bank funds max {0, Qi}
Loans Ci Equity Ei
Total assets Ai Ai
Table 1: Bank i’s stylized balance sheet with central bank operation
where 0 < θi < 1 denotes the relative importance of concerns of liquidity relative to
profitability, γi > 0 is simply a scaling factor. These banks face non-optimal liquidity
holdings, e.g. due to a liquidity shock. We assume that the size and sign of this
liquidity shock is common knowledge for all banks. We acknowledge this assumption
has some limitations, yet it allows us to derive analytical solutions that are otherwise
impossible to obtain. We require that a bank has complete information about how
liquidity is distributed in the banking system without matching liquidity positions to
each bank’s identity. In real markets, when the number of banks in a healthy banking
system is large enough, this distribution should be stable. Additionally, experienced
banks should have a good estimate of this distribution based on past information
(past bids, for instance, are public information). However, this assumption may not
apply to a banking system where the overall liquidity condition varies greatly in
short time. In such a scenario, past information is not so useful to know the how
liquidity is distributed among banks and the assumption of complete information
may not be valid.
In addition to these commercial banks, we introduce a central bank into the banking
system. The purpose of this central bank is to conduct its monetary policy by
increasing or reducing the amount of liquidity in the banking system. How the
central bank makes this decision is beyond our scope and we take this decision as
exogenously given. Using this approach allows us to focus on how banks react to
the decision of the central bank and how it affects interbank markets.
In order to assess the commercial banks’ behaviour we will investigate the injection
and extraction of liquidity by central banks through fixed rate and variable rate
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tenders and will also compare models in which banks neglect the existence of the
interbank market that opens after the central bank intervention and a model where
they consider the opportunities in this market.
3.1 Fixed rate tenders
In a fixed rate tender the central bank determines an interest rate at which it will
lend (borrow) to (from) commercial banks and anyone willing to pay (receive) this
interest rate will be able to do so. Banks do not know the interest rate the central
bank applies and will thus submit a bid schedule for each possible interest rate, i.e.
specify the quantity they demand.
If we use Qi > 0 to denote borrowing from the central bank and Qi < 0 for depositing
additional funds, we know from Xiao & Krause (2017) that for an amount of Qi the
reservation price of banks is given by the following expression:


















for Qi > 0 and














for Qi < 0. It is shown in Xiao & Krause (2017) that r
f < rai < r
b
i , i. e. the bid-ask
spread is always positive. We can easily see this still holds even when Qi approaches
0 as shown in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. limQi→0 r
b
i (Qi)− rai (Qi) > 0.
Obviously banks would not bid at their reservation prices, as this would not allow
the banks to increase their utility level. Hence we would require banks to maximize
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rf − r) ≥ 0
Qi ≤ Q¯i if Qi ≥ 0
−Qi ≤ Ri if Qi ≤ 0
(6)
The first constraint ensures that the bank remains solvent, i.e. any losses it might
make does not exceed its equity, while the second constraint ensures that any bor-
rowing does not exceed any limit set by the central bank on borrowing, Q¯i, e.g.
resulting from absolute limits, limits on leverage, or collateral requirements. The
final constraint ensures that the bank does not seek to deposit more funds within
the central bank than it has cash reserves available.
Conducting this optimization we obtain the demand for central bank money as
detailed in the following proposition:


























if rf < rCBf < r
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i (0)









Here note that Qfi contains both demand for central bank funds (Qi > 0) as well as
deposits with the central bank (Qi < 0). If the central bank is conducting liquidity
injection, i. e. QCB > 0, only demand for liquidity is accepted as a bid, hence bank




. If the central bank is conducting liquidity extraction,












= QCB; due to the monotonicity of the bid schedule this equilib-















Figure 1: Reservation and equilibrium bid schedules in fixed rate tenders
By inverting the demand function for central bank funds we can easily see that the
demand for a given interest rate is lower than the reservation price. Equivalently, the
interest rate that can be charged by the central bank for banks borrowing (lending)
must be smaller (higher) if they want to increase (decrease) the liquidity by a given
amount. This result as detailed in lemma 2 below.


























if Qfi < 0
.
(7)
Figure 1 illustrates this so-called ”bid shading”, where banks submit their bid sched-
ules strategically in order to maximize their utility and do not submit their reser-
vation prices. As we do not consider the objective function of the central bank in
our model, we cannot analyze the welfare implication of this behaviour as any losses
suffered by the central bank cannot be quantified.
We also note from figure 1 that the reservation prices, as well as the optimal prices,
exhibit a jump at Qi = 0. This jump is the equivalent of the bid-ask spread as
explained in lemma 1. The reason for this discontinuity is that the liquidity ratio
ρi has different properties either side of Q
f
i = 0. If bank i deposits money with
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the central bank (Qfi < 0) only cash changes affect ρi. On the other hand if bank
i is borrowing from the central bank, both cash and the total assets change, both
affecting ρi. Because of this the derivative of ρi with respect to Q
f
i is not continuous
at Qi = 0 which results in a jump observed in both bank i’s reservation price and
optimal bid schedule. This result is summarized in the following lemma:


























































While these considerations are based on the inverse bid schedule, it is easy to revert
back to the actual bid schedule. We thus have established that in fixed rate tenders
bid shading exists in that banks submit bids for lower quantities at a given tender
rate in the case of depositing with the central banks as well as borrowing from the
central bank. We could also establish that moving from depositing with the central
bank to borrowing from it, will involve a discontinuity on the bid schedule in that
banks are requiring a significantly higher interest rate to deposit a small amount
with the central bank than to borrow a small amount.
We will now in the coming section conduct the same analysis for variable rate tenders
and will then be in a position to compare the results of these two auction forms.
3.2 Variable rate tenders
In variable rate tenders the central bank exogenously fixes the total amount of
liquidity extracted or injected at QCB. The interest rate is then adjusted such
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that only those banks can participate that have submitted the highest (lowest)
demand schedules for borrowing (depositing). The interest rate is set such that∑N
i=1Qi ≤ QCB. Each bank pays the interest rate at which it has submitted its
bids, i.e. pricing is discriminatory and banks will not pay the same price, but
according to their bid schedule. Therefore the reservation price of a bank will be
the marginal value of any amount obtained. The following lemma determines these
marginal prices:
Lemma 4. In variable rate tenders the marginal prices are given by














1−θi (Di +Bi −Ri)
(Ri +Qi) (Di +Bi +Qi)
for Qi > 0 and














for Qi < 0.
As before for fixed rate tenders, in order to maximize utility, banks will not submit
their marginal prices, but act strategically. Proposition 2 below shows the charac-
terization of one such equilibrium, where we assume that banks know each other’s
liquidity positions.
Proposition 2. Let r˜ ∈ {r ≥ rf ∣∣ ∑Ni=1 max(0, Qfi (r)) = QCB},˜˜r ∈ {r ≥ rf ∣∣ ∑Ni=1 min(0, Qfi (r)) = QCB}, Q˜i(r) ∈{
Qi ≤ Qfi (r˜)
∣∣∣ Ui (ρi(Qi), rEi (r,Qi)) = Ui (ρi (Qfi (r˜)) , rEi (r˜, Qfi (r˜))) , r > rf}, and˜˜
Qi(r) ∈
{
Qi ≥ Qfi (r˜)
∣∣∣ Ui (ρi(Qi), rEi (r,Qi)) = Ui (ρi (Qfi (r˜)) , rEi (r˜, Qfi (r˜))) , r > rf}.
One Nash equilibrium bid schedule is then given by











if rf ≤ r < r˜
Qfi (r˜) if r = r˜







< QCB < 0 the demand schedule is given by
Qvi (r) =

0 if rf ≤ r < ˜˜r or rbi (0) ≥ ˜˜r
Qfi
(˜˜r) if r = ˜˜r
Qfi
(˜˜r)−maxj=1,...,N (˜˜Qj(r)−Qfj (˜˜r)) if r > ˜˜r




i (r) = Q
CB. Due
to the full information banks have of each other’s liquidity position they can fully
anticipate the respective demands and submit bids that ensure this equilibrium to
be reached.
This demand schedule is not easily interpreted and comparable to the result obtained
in the fixed rate tender. Hence we illustrate the equilibrium in figure 2. We see that
the bids submitted by the banks are entirely flat at r˜ and ˜˜r, respectively, until
the quantity bid reaches Qfi . For larger quantities beyond this threshold the rate
acceptable would be lower for liquidity injections and higher for liquidity extractions,
the exact shape depending on the liquidity shocks and preferences of the banks. This
area of the demand schedule has no unique solution for the same allocations and
interest rates. Proposition 2 provides one such bid schedule explicitly.
This inverse bid schedule is given more formally in the following lemma.






(˜˜r) ≥ Qi˜˜r if 0 > Qi > Qfi (˜˜r)





i (r˜) ≤ Qi ≤ Q¯i
,
where R−1(Qi) denotes the inverse function of Qvi (r) as defines in proposition 2.
As in the case of fixed rate tenders we observe bid shading by banks, which can easily
be verified by comparing the equilibrium in proposition 3 below with the marginal












Figure 2: Equilibrium bid schedules in variable rate tenders
Even though, the bid schedules in the two considered tender mechanisms are very
different, we can show that the allocation the central bank achieves can be identical
in both cases, i.e. each bank obtains the same amount and the same interest rate.







From a central bank perspective, the two tender formats generate the same revenue.
Similar results have been found in single unit auctions with risk neutral participants
and a private value framework such as in Vickrey (1961), Holt Jr (1980), or Harris
& Raviv (1981). For multi-unit auctions, as in our case, such a result is not gen-
erally valid. Which auction mechanism gives the higher revenue can be ambiguous
and is also quite sensitive to assumptions about the auction as shown in Ausubel
et al. (2014). In our model using the assumption that information of other banks’
reservation prices are known leads to not only a tractable equilibrium but also the
revenue equivalence of the two auction mechanisms. Given this equivalence between
the two tender formats, we will for the remainder of this paper restrict our analysis
to the variable rate tender without loss of generality.
Thus far we implicitly assumed that banks ignore the fact that after the bidding
for central bank funds an interbank market opens that allows banks to adjust their
liquidity holdings. In the following section we will now relax this assumption and
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allow banks to anticipate this market fully.
3.3 Banks anticipating the interbank market
Until now we have assumed that banks ignore the existence of an interbank market
after the central bank intervention in their considerations. If, however, they antic-
ipate that such an interbank market exists, banks would form expectations about
the future interbank rate and include this in their utility maximization, thus affect-
ing their bidding for central bank money. In interbank markets the total demand
and supply of funds must balance given the bilateral nature of these transactions.
Banks, however, have to consider the impact of the central bank contribution QCB











where Qˆi = Qi + Qˆ
IB
i is the total amount of liquidity bank i gets from the central
bank and it anticipates to get from interbank market. Having anticipated this rate,
banks will now engage in variable rate tender bidding considering this rate. Banks
are not willing to bid at a rate higher (lower) to borrow from (deposit with) the
central bank as waiting for the interbank market would be more profitable. Similarly,
banks would not bid at a lower (higher) rate as the additional profits would entice
other banks to submit a marginally higher bid, such that competition would ensure
the rate submitted to converge towards rˆIB.
Thus banks’ bid schedules would be flat at rˆIB, the amount being such that any
rationing in the allocation is fully anticipated. We summarize this outcome in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let r̂IB ∈
{




, then the equi-
































< QCB < 0
Having established the properties of the equilibrium if banks anticipate the inter-
bank market, we can now continue in the following section to conduct computer
experiments of the interbank market itself and see how the existence of the central
bank affects this market.
4 The interbank market
We have thus far only assessed the bidding behaviour of banks for central bank
funds. In this section we will introduce the mechanism of the subsequent interbank
market and then evaluate the impact of the central bank on the properties of this
market. The interbank market is set up identically to Xiao & Krause (2017) and
we thus briefly characterize its main characteristics to aid the understanding of the
institutional setting but refer to their contribution for a detailed characterisation.
We assume that interbank loans are negotiated bilaterally between banks entering
the market sequentially in a random order. A bank entering the market will approach
all banks in turn in a random order and decide whether to borrow, lend or do nothing
at the interest rate that is being quoted. After each transaction the banks involved
update the prices at which they are willing to conduct transactions; all transactions
are of a fixed size QIB. After this all banks having been involved in a transaction may
then offset the acquired position in further transactions. This process continues until
all banks have been approached and involved in a transaction when it is possible.
After this the next bank enters the market and the process restarts until no further
transactions are possible. The interest rates quoted for a transaction are assumed
to be the reservation prices as shown in equations (4) and (5) and a transaction will
be possible if the reservation prices of bank i lending and bank j borrowing are such
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that rbj ≤ rai .
In Xiao & Krause (2017) it is shown that the network of interbank lending nor-
mally exhibits a core-periphery structure, i. e. a small number of banks are highly
connected with each other (the core) and all other banks (the periphery) connect
to these core banks while having very few connections with each other. We will
investigate whether this structure is maintained in the presence of a central bank,
and will also evaluate other characteristics of the interbank lending network, like the
size of the core, the density, but also properties of the interest rates between banks,
how much they are lending and borrowing in the interbank market, or the return
on equity achieved.
The only difference to the model in Xiao & Krause (2017) is the introduction of a
central bank. As in this paper, we assume that banks face an idiosyncratic liquidity




, which they then seek to offset via the
central bank and the interbank market. In contrast to Xiao & Krause (2017) this
liquidity shock does not have to be balanced on aggregate but will have a positive
sign on average. The interbank market cannot be analyzed analytically, hence we
use computer experiments in our assessment. We run 8000 such experiments with
a wide range of parameter constellations chosen within ranges as detailed in table
2. In order to focus on the effect monetary policy has on the interbank market,
we assume that all banks are homogeneous, e. g. have the same size or leverage;
they will only differ ex-ante in the idiosyncratic liquidity shock they receive. We
assess the impact of the central bank in the cases of liquidity injection and liquidity
extraction, both anticipating the existence of a interbank market and not, as well as
assessing the interbank market only, that is without the presence of a central bank
for comparison purposes.
Looking at the characteristics of the interbank market in table 3 we can see that while
1Please note that we include a fixed interest rate rCB rather than the amount QCB into our
computer experiments. Given the demand schedules there is a clear relationship between these
two variables and they can be set interchangeably. It was computationally more convenient to
exogenously fix the interest rate over the quantity.
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U(a; b) denotes a uniform distribution with a lower limit of a and upper limit of b.
Parameter Symbol Distribution
Assets A fixed at 100
Preferences θ U(0; 0.1)
Leverage 1λ U(0.01; 0.51)
Number of banks N U(10; 1000)
Risk free rate rf U(0.025; 0.125)
Deposit rate rD U(0; rf )
Loan rate rC U(rf ; rf + 0.2)
Interbank loan size QIB U(0; 2)
Distribution of liquidity ρ U(0, 0.05)
ρ U(ρ, ρ+ 0.25)
Collateral constraint Q U(0.1; 0.8)








Table 2: Parameter selection for simulations
the main properties still remain valid in the presence of a central bank conducting
its monetary policy, there are some distinct properties that deserve closer attention.
Firstly we notice that the injection of liquidity by the central bank reduces the inter-
bank rate while the extraction increases it. This validates the empirical observation
that central bank operations affect interbank lending rates. We also note that this
effect is stronger for liquidity injections than liquidity extractions. While we observe
this effect across lending between all groups of banks, core and periphery, we have
the strongest effect on banks in the core lending to those in the periphery. Finally,
in the case of liquidity injection the differences in interest rates between core and
periphery banks overall reduce, thus the advantages core banks have over periphery
banks in terms of profitability from engaging in the interbank market, will also be
smaller.
The amount of interbank lending reduces in the presence of a central bank, particu-
larly when injecting liquidity, suggesting that those banks facing a liquidity shortfall
can meet a sizeable fraction of their demand from the central bank. This reduced
interbank lending then manifests itself in a weaker core-periphery structure. How-
ever, the density of the interbank lending network is not affected significantly as on
the one hand less interbank lending occurs overall but on the other hand less banks
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are active in the interbank market. Given that inactive banks are not included in
our network analysis, the density remains approximately stable. Overall, differences
between the case of banks anticipating the subsequent interbank market and not an-
ticipating it are minimal, thus suggesting that such an anticipation is not important
to the interbank structure.
Our observations suggest that monetary policy decisions to inject or extract liquidity
affects most strongly banks in the periphery, i. e. mostly smaller banks. Hence, while
central bank operations have the desired effect on the interbank market, its effect
varies between banks, depending on their position in the interbank market. This
has potential implications for central banks as differences in the change of costs for
funds can have distributional effects and might well affect the lending these banks
do with clients of periphery banks more affected than those of core banks.
Furthermore, the amount of interbank lending and borrowing reduces, potentially
affecting the liquidity of the interbank market. By looking in more detail at the bor-
rowing and lending in interbank markets in table 4 we are able to shed some further
light on this aspect. We see clearly that interbank borrowing and lending reduces
mainly for core banks, with periphery banks actually experiencing an increase in
interbank borrowing for liquidity injections and interbank lending for liquidity ex-
tractions. Hence with central bank interventions the borrowing and lending of core
banks reduces while periphery banks will increase their exposure to the interbank
market to meet their liquidity requirements.
Interestingly, core banks will see a reduced return on equity with liquidity injec-
tion. With liquidity extraction, their returns remains more or less the same when
not anticipating interbank market and are slightly increased when anticipating so.
However, periphery banks increase their return on equity in all cases. Both partici-
pation in the central bank operation and the interbank market affect banks’ return
on equity. For the former, we see that periphery banks are more engaging compared






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































market. This is still the case although not as evident when they are not anticipat-
ing the interbank market, because auction allocations are then concentrated among
much smaller group of banks and not reflected in medians. Even though the amounts
involved are small, it can actually increase returns of some periphery banks com-
pared to the case in which no central bank is present. The core banks are much less
reliant on central bank funds, their change in returns can be explained by interbank
lending/borrowing rates as discussed below.
We see that core banks are borrowing at a lower rate than they are lending with
or without the presence of central bank, while for periphery banks this is reversed.
The difference between the borrowing rate and lending rate is reduced for both core
and periphery banks in liquidity injection and remain roughly the same in liquidity
extraction. This means the profit core banks can get from borrowing at lower rate
than lending is reduced in liquidity injection and therefore have lower returns. Sim-
ilarly, periphery banks also benefit from lending/borrowing at a lower/higher rate
for liquidity injection and see an increase in returns. And although such benefits are
not as pronounced in liquidity extraction, lending to the central bank still increases
their returns.
From these statistics we can clearly see that central bank interventions through
the injection or extraction of liquidity affects banks differently, depending on their
position in the network. With funding costs and liquidity affecting the lending
behaviour of banks, such an asymmetry can have an profound impact on the type
of companies that are able to receive loans. It is reasonable to say that periphery
banks will normally be smaller, regionally focused banks that will have a different
client base to the usually larger and often globally acting core banks.
While these results suggest the importance of the position of a bank in the network
to assess how it is affected by any policies of the central bank, we have also seen
that the network structure itself is affected by the conduct of the central bank. In













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































independent variables in our model, we have conducted a number of regressions
in tables 5-8 that use the log changes in the network from the situation in which
only the interbank market existed as the dependent variable. Firstly we note that
the results are highly consistent across the four different market types (liquidity
extraction and injection with and without anticipating the interbank market) and
thus can be analyzed jointly.
How much the network structure is affected by the fact that a central bank injects
or extracts liquidity is mainly determined by the amount of liquidity the central
bank seeks to inject or extract (QCB), the preferences for liquidity (θ), the size of
the interbank trading (QIB), the bank leverage (λ) and in some instances also the
size of the liquidity shock (
ρ+ρ
2
) and its variability (ρ − ρ). In the case of liquidity
injection, a larger central bank intervention weakens the core-periphery structure of
the interbank network and also reduces the number of banks participating in the
interbank network itself. This arises from the fact that with the additional liquidity
the banks have less needs to seek such funds in the interbank market, thus reducing
their participation and any borrowing and lending gets more equally spread out
between banks often trading excess liquidity. The same effect can be observed if
banks have a stronger preference for liquidity over returns.
Interestingly, for liquidity extractions this effect is reversed, although the effect here
is much smaller. Due to banks’ preference for liquidity the lower liquidity in the
banking system after the central bank operation will see banks attempting to secure
additional funds in the interbank market. Banks in the core are best placed to offer
terms that are favourable to other banks due to their increased leverage and this
reinforces the core-periphery structure by having banks link to them.
A larger amount of interbank loans in each transaction (QIB) strengthens the core-
periphery structure as larger interbank loans will result in less transactions for the
same total amount of borrowing and lending. These fewer transactions will then be
more concentrated with the larger banks in the core and thus lead to less transactions
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This table shows the parameter estimate of on OLS regression of the indicated independent vari-
ables on the dependent variables, that are all defined as log differences of these variables between
the variable in case of liquidity injection by the central bank without anticipating the existence of
an interbank market and the case of an interbank market only. Component size denotes the size
of the largest component in the network, the Core ratio denotes the fraction of banks in the core,
the Error score denotes the quality of core-periphery network with 0 being a perfect core-periphery
structure and 1 showing no such structure at all, the Density the fraction of the possible links
between banks that actually exist and rCB the rate at which the central bank lends to banks. The
number in brackets denotes their t-values and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level,
∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ at the 10% level.
Component size Core ratio Error score Density rCB
CONSTANT −1.7121*** 0.7598*** 0.7982*** 0.8689*** −2.0635***
(−10.32) (4.07) (5.65) (4.93) (−21.23)
logQCB −0.9675*** 0.3502*** 0.6716*** 0.4465*** −0.4959***
(−31.11) (10.02) (25.33) (13.50) (−27.07)
θ −2.1025*** 2.5175*** 1.4960*** 2.1619*** 31.4174***
(−3.44) (3.67) (2.87) (3.3297) (86.43)
logQIB −0.2068*** 0.3574*** −0.0231* 0.3561***
(−13.38) (20.57) (−1.75) (21.66)
logN 0.9016*** −0.3329*** −0.6210*** −0.3995*** 0.5023***
(24.82) (−8.1511) (−20.05) (−10.34) (23.47)
log λ 0.2990*** −0.1988*** −0.1139*** −0.2194*** −0.5742***
(13.49) (−7.9772) (−6.03) (−9.30) (−43.82)
ρ+ρ
2 −1.1180 1.2469 −2.0202* 1.6954 −12.7845***
(−0.86) (0.85) (−1.81) (1.22) (−16.43)
ρ− ρ 7.7649*** −4.5430*** −2.5224*** −5.7299*** 3.8852***
(10.86) (−5.65) (−4.14) (−7.53) (9.22)
rf −0.1516 −0.2379 −0.2696 −0.1195 0.0136
(−0.19) (−0.26) (−0.39) (−0.14) (0.03)
rD −0.1413 0.8716 0.1463 0.4482 −2.6807***
(−0.19) (1.02) (0.23) (0.55) (−5.91)
rC 0.3099 −0.2083 −0.1927 −0.1809 3.1764***
(0.93) (−0.56) (−0.68) (−0.51) (16.03)
Q −0.0188 −0.0052 0.0575 0.0357 −0.0163
(−0.25) (−0.06) (0.91) (0.45) (−0.37)
Observations 2957 2957 2957 2957 2957
R2 0.2930 0.1468 0.2096 0.1761 0.8286
Table 5: Liquidity injection with separated market
between banks in the periphery. Banks with a higher leverage will have a stronger
emphasis on profitability due to the impact on return on equity and thus encourage
borrowing and lending from them, resulting in a core-periphery structure.
With more banks it is easier to sustain a core-periphery structure and a larger core
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This table shows the parameter estimate of on OLS regression of the indicated independent vari-
ables on the dependent variables, that are all defined as log differences of these variables between
the variable in case of liquidity injection by the central bank with anticipating the existence of an
interbank market and the case of an interbank market only. Component size denotes the size of
the largest component in the network, the Core ratio denotes the fraction of banks in the core, the
Error score denotes the quality of core-periphery network with 0 being a perfect core-periphery
structure and 1 showing no such structure at all, the Density the fraction of the possible links
between banks that actually exist and rCB the rate at which the central bank lends to banks. The
number in brackets denotes their t-values and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level,
∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ at the 10% level.
Component size Core ratio Error score Density rCB
CONSTANT −1.1113*** 0.6532*** 0.2401 0.6894*** −1.9990***
(−5.29) (2.85) (1.61) (3.28) (−14.81)
logQCB −0.4574*** 0.0857*** 0.2849*** 0.1632*** −0.1291***
(−21.22) (3.65) (18.58) (7.56) (−9.24)
θ −1.0433 0.7631 −1.0049* 1.4230* 32.0956***
(−1.25) (0.84) (−1.70) (1.71) (59.05)
logQIB −0.1350*** 0.3263*** −0.0746*** 0.3541***
(−6.76) (14.98) (−5.25) (17.70)
logN 0.4054*** −0.1187*** −0.2282*** −0.1452*** 0.1642***
(11.96) (−3.21) (−9.46) (−4.28) (7.46)
log λ 0.1682*** −0.1250*** −0.0123 −0.1536*** −0.6367***
(6.08) (−4.15) (−0.63) (−5.55) (−35.40)
ρ+ρ
2 −6.4465*** 6.2706*** −0.8292 6.2720*** −12.6672***
(−3.90) (3.48) (−0.71) (3.79) (−11.74)
ρ− ρ 6.8850*** −5.0466*** 0.4267 −6.1587*** 0.7637
(7.11) (−4.78) (0.62) (−6.35) (1.22)
rf −0.4131 0.2727 0.5891 0.0728 0.2959
(−0.38) (0.23) (0.76) (0.07) (0.42)
rD −1.4853 1.2928 0.2329 1.6686 −2.1689***
(−1.43) (1.14) (0.32) (1.61) (−3.20)
rC 0.4367 −0.5181 −0.0970 −0.3802 3.2046***
(0.96) (−1.04) (−0.30) (−0.83) (10.76)
Q 0.1065 −0.0773 −0.0544 −0.0564 −0.0308
(1.068) (−0.71) (−0.77) (−0.57) (−0.47)
Observations 1639 1639 1639 1639 1639
R2 0.2366 0.1315 0.2346 0.1856 0.7926
Table 6: Liquidity injection with interdependent market
as generally more trading will occur, allowing for this property to emerge. More
diversity in the liquidity shocks banks face (ρ − ρ) strengthens the core-periphery
structure while ensuring more banks participate. This arises as more diversity of
liquidity needs increases the need and the ability to offset any imbalances banks
have in their liquidity positions. If the mean of the liquidity shock increases this
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This table shows the parameter estimate of on OLS regression of the indicated independent vari-
ables on the dependent variables, that are all defined as log differences of these variables between
the variable in case of liquidity extraction by the central bank without anticipating the existence
of an interbank market and the case of an interbank market only. Component size denotes the size
of the largest component in the network, the Core ratio denotes the fraction of banks in the core,
the Error score denotes the quality of core-periphery network with 0 being a perfect core-periphery
structure and 1 showing no such structure at all, the Density the fraction of the possible links be-
tween banks that actually exist and rCB the rate at which the banks deposit funds at the central
bank. The number in brackets denotes their t-values and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at
the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ at the 10% level.
Component size Core ratio Error score Density rCB
CONSTANT −0.4712*** 0.1522* 0.1617 0.1096* −1.2496***
(−11.84) (1.70) (1.48) (1.96) (−13.80)
logQCB −0.0393*** −0.0635*** −0.0246*** −0.0673*** 0.1057***
(−13.69) (−9.82) (−3.11) (−16.66) (16.08)
θ 0.0547 −1.1632*** −0.4914 0.0162 31.8212***
(0.35) (−3.34) (−1.15) (0.07) (89.68)
logQIB −0.0590*** 0.0718*** 0.0226** 0.0800***
(−14.59) (7.89) (2.03) (14.08)
logN 0.0479*** 0.0199 −0.0056 0.0401*** −0.0931***
(8.34) (1.54) (−0.36) (4.98) (−7.09)
log λ 0.0217*** 0.0058 0.0214 −0.0098 −0.7112***
(4.12) (0.49) (1.48) (−1.33) (−59.17)
ρ+ρ
2 3.3306*** 1.5224** −0.6782 0.8043* −15.9242***
(10.58) (2.15) (−0.78) (1.82) (−22.11)
ρ− ρ −0.4736** −1.5931*** −0.3223 −1.7308*** 1.3289***
(−2.52) (−3.78) (−0.62) (−6.57) (3.10)
rf −0.1169 0.6372 −0.1005 0.2800 0.3807
(−0.58) (1.40) (−0.18) (0.99) (0.82)
rD 0.0284 0.0157 0.5748 −0.0617 −2.8166***
(0.15) (0.04) (1.08) (−0.23) (−6.35)
rC −0.0173 −0.0852 −0.2034 0.0376 3.1769***
(−0.20) (−0.45) (−0.87) (0.32) (16.36)
Q −0.0140 −0.0119 −0.0236 0.0194 −0.0204
(−0.75) (−0.28) (−0.46) (0.73) (−0.47)
Observations 3623 3623 3623 3623 3623
R2 0.16 0.0718 0.0117 0.1955 0.7935
Table 7: Liquidity extraction with separated market
seems to have very limited effect on the structure of the network, mainly increasing
the size of the core and due to the excess liquidity more transactions are required
to offset them between banks.
It is note worthy that the overall fit of the regressions reported in tables 5-8, as
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measured by R2, is significantly lower for liquidity extraction. The origin of this
observation can be found in the fact that for large liquidity extractions the prefer-
ences of the banks for liquidity become overwhelming, which leads to non-linearities
which these regressions do not allow to incorporate. 2
Finally we have also considered the determinants of the rate the central bank applies
to their lending or deposits, comprising the final column in tables 5-8. Not surpris-
ingly a larger amount of central bank intervention reduces (increases) the interest
rate for liquidity injection (extraction). Also intuitively understandable is that banks
having a stronger preference for liquidity increases the interest rate. While this re-
sult is not surprising, it is worth mentioning explicitly as it shows how preferences
of banks, as they vary in light of adverse conditions, might affect funding costs di-
rectly and thus at least partially offset the policy decisions of central banks. A larger
number of banks competing for a given amount of central bank funds will obviously
increase (decrease) the interest rate in the case of liquidity injection (extraction).
If the liquidity shock is on average more positive, this means more liquidity is in
the banking system, thus reducing the interest rates due to the lower demand for
liquidity. A larger variability of liquidity will, however, increase the interest rates.
Here the variability means that more banks face large imbalances and thus are keen
to offset these. Those facing a liquidity shortage will demand larger funds from
the central bank in the case of a liquidity injection while those facing larger excess
liquidity will stay out of this market, thus increasing this interest rate. In the case
of liquidity extraction the missing demand for central bank deposits by banks with
liquidity shortages will similarly drive up interest rates.
Banking systems with a higher leverage face lower interest rates. Due to the higher
leverage the impact of central bank funds on the liquidity ratio is smaller, thus
making them less important to the bank and they are demanding less central bank
2We note that the R2 for rCB is very high. As all explanatory variables are chosen exogenously
we can discard the problem of endogeneity and in Appendix B show that our results are robust
for multicollineraity.
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This table shows the parameter estimate of on OLS regression of the indicated independent vari-
ables on the dependent variables, that are all defined as log differences of these variables between
the variable in case of liquidity extraction by the central bank with anticipating the existence of
an interbank market and the case of an interbank market only. Component size denotes the size
of the largest component in the network, the Core ratio denotes the fraction of banks in the core,
the Error score denotes the quality of core-periphery network with 0 being a perfect core-periphery
structure and 1 showing no such structure at all, the Density the fraction of the possible links
between banks that actually exist and rCB the rate at which banks deposit funds at the central
bank. The number in brackets denotes their t-values and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at
the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ at the 10% level.
Component size Core ratio Error score Density rCB
CONSTANT −0.5524*** 0.2312* 0.1283 0.2571*** −0.7208***
(−9.79) (1.68) (0.65) (3.35) (−5.51)
logQCB −0.0733*** −0.0764*** −0.1141*** −0.0840*** 0.0917***
(−11.16) (−4.77) (−5.00) (−9.42) (6.03)
θ −0.2880 −0.7924 −2.2459*** 0.1360 31.4471***
(−1.35) (−1.52) (−3.03) (0.47) (63.60)
logQIB −0.0615*** 0.0858*** −0.0847*** 0.1126***
(−10.56) (6.04) (−4.18) (14.21)
logN 0.0754*** 0.0493** 0.0374 0.0673*** −0.1201***
(7.92) (2.12) (1.13) (5.19) (−5.45)
log λ 0.0399*** −0.0167 0.0497* −0.0276*** −0.7357***
(5.29) (−0.90) (1.89) (−2.69) (−42.10)
ρ+ρ
2 3.4400*** −0.1671 3.9430** 0.9526 −17.7083***
(6.72) (−0.13) (2.21) (1.37) (−14.93)
ρ− ρ −0.2146 −0.6882 −1.1652 −2.1675*** 2.5934***
(−0.66) (−0.86) (−1.02) (−4.87) (3.42)
rf −0.0334 −0.3332 −1.2677 −0.0160 0.1506
(−0.12) (−0.48) (−1.29) (−0.04) (0.23)
rD 0.0035 0.9306 1.3341 0.0063 −3.0885***
(0.01) (1.44) (1.45) (0.02) (−5.034)
rC 0.1907 −0.0860 −0.4982 −0.2230 2.8889***
(1.63) (−0.30) (−1.23) (−1.40) (10.68)
Q −0.0343 −0.1076* 0.0058 0.0009 0.0735
(−1.32) (−1.69) (0.06) (0.03) (1.22)
Observations 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571
R2 0.24 0.0608 0.0561 0.2696 0.8168
Table 8: Liquidity extraction with interdependent market
funds, reducing the interest rate. Also, a higher leverage tends to be associated
with a lower return prior to the commencement of the central bank operation, which
makes a bank value liquidity less. The observation that higher deposit rates reduce
interest rates and higher lending rates increase it arises from their respective effects
on the returns of the banks. A higher deposit rate reduces returns to banks and thus
118
banks are more concerned about this aspect. Consequently they are less willing to
pay high interest rates while the exact opposite is the case for high lending rates.
5 Conclusions
We have developed a model of the demand by banks for central bank funds. Banks
have a preference for liquidity as well as profitability and as such balance those two
needs; this is in contrast to most models developed previously that assume banks are
only optimizing profitability. Our models considered fixed rate as well as variable
rate tenders and also included the anticipation of a subsequent interbank market.
We derived the equilibria in those models and were able to show the equivalence of
fixed rate and variable rate tenders in terms of interest rates applied and quantities
allocated to banks. We also showed the existence of bid shading and flat bids in
variable tender tenders.
Furthermore we assessed the structure of the interbank market and how it changes
in the presence of a central bank. While we found that overall changes are relatively
small, we were able to establish that bank in different positions in the interbank
network were affected differently. It was found that the impact of liquidity injections
and extractions were affecting banks in the periphery - usually smaller banks - much
more than banks in the core - usually larger banks. In the presence of a central
bank, banks in the periphery tend to participate more in the interbank market.
This asymmetry in the effect on banks arising from the presence of a central bank
might have significant policy implications as it could well affect the lending policies
of banks differently and subsequently the supply of loans to the economy.
In this paper we only considered auctions, but open market operations are a sig-
nificant and often the only way central banks manage the liquidity in the banking
system. While many aspects of open market operations will be similar to auctions,
it would be worth in future research to investigate such a setting. Furthermore we
do not consider what banks actually do with the liquidity they obtain as in many
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cases banks will re-invest them into loans, in particular if liquidity is provided for
longer terms. Such re-investments will naturally affect the rate of return and might
alter the incentives for banks.
Another interesting extension is to have interbank trading prior to the auction of
central bank funds. This is especially useful if we would like to relax the main
assumption adopted in this model that the central bank’s monetary policy is exoge-
nous. This allows us to apply the framework of this study to explore other important
functions of central banks, for instance the lender of last resort, where the aim of
liquidity injection is to relief the shortage of liquidity in the banking system. It is
possible to consider one such banking system where banks are under high aggregate
deposit withdrawals. When the interbank market opens before central bank oper-
ations commence, the interbank trading is likely to be less active due to liquidity
shortage while the auction of central bank funds afterwards may supply banks with
additional liquidity. Further adjustments to the model may be needed to make it
more realistic. For example, the amount of liquidity injection could be dependent
on the shortage of funds among banks. Also, banks may form an expectation of
liquidity injection during their bilateral trading since they know they are short of
cash. However such extensions are beyond the scope of this paper and therefore left
for future research.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Based on reservation prices in equations (4) and (5) we easily get limQ→0 rai (Qi) =





and limQ→0 rbi (Qi) = r
b












A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Let us first consider the case of liquidity injection, i. e. Qi > 0. The optimization




























> 0, U11 =
∂2Ui
∂ρ2i
< 0, U12 = U21 =
∂2Ui
∂ρi∂rEi




Therefore the solution to the problem in equation (6) is either at the boundary if




gives the local maximum. The first constraint cannot be binding as insolvency gives
zero utility. Also note the last constraint is binding when bank i’s valuation for
borrowing is already lower than rCBf at Qi = 0, that is r
a
i (0) < r
CB
f . Therefore, we













if rf < rCBf < r
a
i (0)
0 if rai (0) ≤ rCBf
, where
ϕ = ψ2i − (Di +Bi)Ri r
CB−rai (0)
rCB−rf .
Secondly, consider liquidity extraction, i. e. Qi < 0. Similarly, this problem has a
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The second constraint is binding when bank i’s valuation for lending is already




i (0). Solving for the local maximum by
letting dUi
dQi







0 if rf < rCBf ≤ rbi (0)
θi
(1+rEi )Ei
rCB−rf − (1− θi)Ri if rbi (0) < rCBf
.
Combining these two results gives us the result shown in the proposition.
Dropping the constraint that Qi ≤ Qi as it does not affect the sign of the derivative























)2 < 0 (9)
in the case of liquidity extraction.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is trivial from inverting the equilibrium bid schedule in proposition 1.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
We prove the individual parts in turn:
1. By inserting Qfi = 0 into the inverse bid schedule given in lemma 2 we instantly
see that these are identical to the reservation prices defined in lemma 1.
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2. By inserting Qfi = 0 into the inverse bid schedule given in lemma 2 we instantly
see that these are identical to the reservation prices defined in lemma 1.
3. rai (0)− rbi (0) = θi1−θi
(1+rEi )Ei
Di+Bi
> 0 which in combination with claims 1 and 2 of
this lemma completes this proof.









. As the reservation
prices are determined such that upon making a deposit of Qfi , the utility level
does not change from the situation of not making a deposit. Receiving an




will reduce the utility level of bank i, contradicting














. As the reservation
prices are determined such that upon taking a loan from the central bank of
Qfi , the utility level does not change from the situation of not taking a loan.




will reduce the utility level of bank i,





A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
The marginal prices here are bank i’s marginal valuation for liquidity. Thus, for














, where rai and r
b
i are the reservation
prices given determined in equations (4) and (5).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
We prove both claims in this proposition in turn, commencing with the case of
liquidity injection. Let us consider an arbitrary bank i and denote the equilibrium
demand schedule of any bank by Qvi (r). If all banks, apart from bank i submit their
optimal demand schedules and the total supply of liquidity by the central bank is
QCB, the residual demand schedule this bank faces, considering the constraint on
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where we require that r > rf . Assume now that Qci is on the optimal demand curve
for bank i at an interest rate rc. This rate rc would be the lowest possible rate at
which the bank can submit its bid and still obtain the requested amount. Due to
discriminatory pricing in variable rate auctions, any bid higher than rc would result
in a utility loss as the bank pays more than it has to. Thus for any rate r > rc
the submitted demand is zero. On the other hand, at a rate r < rc a bid would
not be successful as it is too low, hence what price or amount is submitted becomes
irrelevant. Hence the only possible equilibrium would be for a bank to submit a bid
at exactly rc for the quantity it requires at that rate.
In the following we show that in equilibrium a bank will submit a bid schedule as
indicated in the proposition.
If rai (0) ≤ r˜ the reservation price of not submitting a bid, or equivalently a bid of
zero, is optimal as exceeding your reservation price will result in a loss of utility.
In all other cases we now show that alternative points on the residual demand
schedule give the bank a lower utility and can thus not be an equilibrium. Let us
now consider another equilibrium r̂ 6= r˜. If we have that rai (0) > r̂ > r˜, we find that





In the case of r̂ ≤ r˜ we compare Q˜i (r̂) and Qci (r̂). By construction Q˜i (r̂) gives the
same utility level at r̂ as Qfi (r˜) at r˜, i. e. it lies on the same indifference curve as
the optimal demand schedule. If Q˜i (r̂) ≥ Qci (r̂) then Qci would give the bank less
cash than Q˜i at the same price; given that banks prefer more cash, this would lead
to a lower utility level and would thus not be optimal.
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We now show that Q˜i (r̂) ≥ Qci (r̂) as follows:

































































where the last step is obtained as Qfi (r˜) ≤ Q¯i and Q¯j − Qfj (r˜) and Qfk (r˜) −























= Q˜i(r̂) + (N − 1)Q¯i −QCB
≥ 0.
In the case of liquidity extraction the same steps are followed as above. The possible
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where we take into account that banks cannot deposit more than their cash reserves
and require that r > rf . With the same arguments made before, for any r < rc, the
optimal interest rate, the bank does not receive sufficient interest on their deposits
with the central bank and thus will bid an amount of zero. Furthermore if rbi (0) ≥ r˜
the reservation price is too high for the bank to bid for depositing cash with the
central bank, and thus will also bid an amount of zero.




inserting for Qvj (r). In the case that r̂ ≥ r˜ we follow the same arguments as in the
case of liquidity injection and need to show that Qi(r̂) ≤ Qci(r̂). We obtain




































The penultimate step arises as Qfi (r˜) ≥ −Ri and Qk(r̂) ≥ Qfk (r˜).
A.7 Proof of Lemma 5
This lemma follows from the definition of the inverse bid schedule, rvi (Qi) =
inf
{
r > rf |Qvi (r) ≤ Qi
}
. It is also obvious that rvi (Qi) is a non-increasing
function of Qi. To show this, we only need to show that R
−1(Qi)















(˜˜r)) are non-increasing as can easily be seen.
A.8 Proof of proposition 3








also clears the market when bid
schedules are as described in proposition 2. First consider the case of Qfi ≥ 0, when















r ≥ rf |∑Ni max(0, Qfi (r)) = QCB}. Note that Qfi (r) is strictly decreasing






is strictly decreasing as 0 <
QCB < (N−1)Q¯i and has thus a unique solution. Therefore, r˜ defined in proposition
2 equals rCBf , since Q
v
i (r
∗) = Qfi (r
∗) (if r˜ > rai (0) this also holds as both are zero),




i (r˜) = Q
CB clears
the market while any r < r˜ cannot.
The proof for Qfi ≤ 0 follows exactly the same process.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 4










clears the market. We show
here that a bank i cannot gain higher expected utility after the interbank market
by deviating from the bid schedule proposed here. As shown in proposition 2, it is
optimal for any bank i to pay no more than the clearing rate of the primary market,
so in the following we only consider bid schedules where a bank demands zero if the
interest rate charged is larger than expected clearing rate in the interbank market.
We show the case for liquidity injection here as for liquidity extraction the argument
can be made in exactly the same way.
Let us consider bank i having any alternative bid schedule where it bids Qi > 0 at
a rate rCBi and Qi = 0 at some rate r > r
CB
i . Firstly, if r
CB
i < r̂
IB, bank i does
not participate in the primary market but only the interbank market. This does
not change the clearing rate as the reduced allocation to bank i is compensated by
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increased allocation to other banks. Consequently, in the interbank market, bank
i demands more funds while other banks are expected to demand less due to their
increased allocation by the central bank, hence the aggregate amount is unchanged
and so is the expected interbank rate. Here bank i only shifts part of its demand
from central bank funds to the interbank market and its expected overall utility
increase is the same; hence it is not better off.




) ≥ Qi 6= QIi (r̂IB), this results in bank i
borrowing less from the central bank as the rate is less favourable and this has a
similar effect as in the case where rCBi < r̂















the optimal amount that maximize i’s utility or by over-reporting its demand bank
i also makes the demand for liquidity to be greater in subsequent interbank markets
and thus raises the expected interbank rate for all banks, including itself.
Thirdly, if rCBi > r̂




bank i would be strictly worse off
because it pays more for liquidity from the central bank as well as the interbank
market. The former is obvious and the latter is because over-reporting bank
i’s demand raises expected interbank rates as discussed above. On the other






, bank i would still be worse off. Suppose in this case,
bank i gets an allocation of QCBi from the central bank and demands Q
IB
i in
the interbank market. Obviously, for QCBi , bank i pays more than r̂
IB which
reduces its utility. For QIBi , there is a chance bank i pays less than r̂
IB, even
so, this is not enough to compensate for i’s utility loss from central bank funds.
Suppose the opposite is true, that bank i pays in the interbank market rIBi < r̂
IB,
keeping its utility the same as before. Consider all combinations of rate and





















, r̂IB > r > rf
}
.
If the collateral constraint is not binding for bank i, it has to demand QIBi in order







. If the collateral is binding, equality holds here.
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Overall, this implies interbank markets cannot clear as banks’ aggregate demand
must be more than the supply due to a drop in interbank market rate and the fact
bank i is also demanding more than or equal as before. Therefore, bank i cannot
reach the same level of utility as originally.
B Appendix: Robustness for multicollineraity
In tables 5,6,7,8 the regressions on rCB have quite high R2. We can rule out the pos-
sibility of endogeneity since the independent variables are parameters of our model
which are exogenous. We investigate the correlation matrices among independent
variables and find that most of them are only weakly correlated. However, we do
find three exceptions:
1. rf and rD, rf and rC are moderately correlated;
2. mean and variance of the liquidity distribution are also strongly correlated;
3. the amount of central bank operation is correlated with the number of total
banks.
The first exception is consistent with our setting, as rD and rC have to be within
reasonable range (not too distant from rf ) so that we can observe central bank
operations and subsequent interbank trading. The second exception is expected
from the construction and the third exception arises as the operation amount needs
to be reasonable compared to the size of the banking system, such that there could
be sufficient interbank trading and thus we include it in our sample. In other words,
in order to observe sufficient interbank trading, the number of total banks and the
amount of operation need to be compatible with each other, this serves as the source
for observed correlation. We also consider alternative regression models that exclude
rf , the number of total banks, N , and variance of the liquidity distribution, ρ−ρ, for
each of the tables 5, 6, 7, 8. And we find that these changes have limited effects on
our regression results (see table 13), particularly the R2 of each regression is about














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT −0.5420*** −1.2970*** −1.7568*** −1.3064***
(−6.68) (−13.37) (−29.51) (−13.82)
logQCB −0.1431*** −0.0643*** 0.0909*** 0.0634***
(−12.87) (−5.85) (16.73) (6.33)
θ 31.6816*** 32.1331*** 31.7588*** 31.3204***
(79.02) (58.43) (88.90) (62.43)
log λ −0.6726*** −0.6554*** −0.7050*** −0.7272***
(−49.14) (−36.31) (−58.48) (−41.43)
ρ+ρ
2 −11.5978*** −12.3574*** −13.5551*** −13.3554***
(−31.00) (−25.56) (−43.32) (−30.00)
rD −2.9156*** −2.0360*** −2.6195*** −3.0857***
(−6.75) (−3.42) (−6.74) (−5.72)
rC 3.0531*** 3.3024*** 3.2491*** 3.0062***
(15.41) (12.19) (18.34) (12.02)
Q −0.0343 −0.0064 −0.0178 0.0799
(−1.32) (−0.10) (−0.41) (1.30)
Observations 2957 1639 3623 1571
R2 0.7902 0.7854 0.7894 0.8091
Table 13: OLS regression against rCB with rf , log(N) and ρ− ρ excluded. (1) is to




We show in general how interbank lending networks emerge, and what determinants
drive their structures and give rise to their properties. Essay 1 has presented a
model of interbank lending where risk averse banks seek to maximize expected prof-
its by observing and extracting information from other banks’ lending decision. It
has provided a link between asymmetric information and interbank market freeze.
Essay 2 introduced a framework where banks balance their needs for cash and re-
turn by bilateral interbank transactions when facing idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
Realistic results were obtained including emergence of the core-periphery structure
and endogenously determined interest rates. Essay 3 based on the interbank market
in essay 2 introduced a central bank operation in the form of auction. The monetary
policy is found to affect individual banks differently while the general structure of
the interbank market is maintained. The study helps to better understand systemic
risk which is shown to be dependent on interbank network structures. Thus it is also
of importance for the macro prudential regulation which aims to manage such risk.
Moreover, monetary policy is shown in the study to impact banks differently. An
awareness of the degree of such asymmetry can help to the correct implementation
and transmission of monetary policy.
Admittedly, there are some limitations in this study and some can be left for future
work. For instance, in essay 1, we consider a three-bank interbank market for sim-
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plicity. The limitation in the number of banks restrain us from exploring properties
that only emerge in large interbank networks, and from considering alternative as-
sumptions like a partial observation of the interbank network. Another limitation
of essay 1 is that our setting for the interbank rollover lending is static, while a
more complete analysis should consider rollovers that are made dynamically. For
the model in essay 3, we limit the monetary policy in our model to only auctions
of central bank funds, while in reality various forms of open market operation are
also influential and worth studying. In addition, our model also do not consider
banks that can use short-term funding to re-invest into long-term loans. Taking
re-investment into consideration will certainly influence banks’ profits and include a
risk of default, which consequently change banks’ bidding and trading behaviours.
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